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1 Introduction
Economists have long called attention to the dangers of excessive corporate leverage because of the
critical role the financial stability of the U.S. corporate sector plays in the persistence and initiation
of business cycles (Bernanke and Gertler (1989)). The aggregate leverage of nonfinancial U.S. firms
rose from 11% to 47% by the early 1990s, but in stark contrast, leverage sharply declined since then.
What changes in financial market conditions or practices brought about this deleveraging trend?
Leading explanations such as changes in tax rates, bankruptcy costs, and leveraged buyout rates
cannot fully account for the deleveraging (Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014)). In this paper, we
show institutional investors’ evolving role in firm governance explains an economically meaningful
portion of individual firm capital structure changes as well as the aggregate deleveraging trend.
While the rising power of institutional investors is well-documented (e.g., Aghion, Van Reenen,
and Zingales (2013)), the notion that they use their power to reduce leverage seems surprising at
first. Savvy institutional investors such as hedge funds and private equity funds are often glamorized
in the business press for exerting their influence over management to increase corporate debt levels
and thereby leverage their returns. Yet in contrast to hedge funds and private equity firms’ modus
operandi with respect to debt, the leverage of non-financial U.S. firms has steadily declined for the
last two decades. To reconcile this contradiction, we study a broader set of institutional investors
and find increases in ownership by other institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension
funds account for a significant portion of the decline in leverage over time.
To understand how institutional ownership and leverage vary on average within firms, we analyze
institutional investors’ effect on leverage. To empirically establish credible point estimates, we must
overcome the challenge that neither leverage nor institutional ownership is randomly assigned.1 To
overcome this bias and other empirical challenges, we employ an instrumental variable strategy
that uses implied mutual fund trades generated from idiosyncratic, individual-investor flows as
1As an example, suppose a firm’s latent investment opportunities improved. If institutional investors predicted
such an improvement which led them to increase their holdings in that firm, and subsequently, the firm issued
equity to fund the latent investment opportunities, we would observe both a decrease in leverage and an increase
in institutional holdings. Yet in this hypothetical setting, any claims that increases in institutional ownership lead
to decreases in leverage would be spurious, because the observed negative interrelation is through latent investment
opportunities rather than through a direct effect.
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an instrument for institutional holdings. Using the disclosed stock holdings of mutual funds and
individual-investors’ flows to and from the mutual funds, we construct implied annual mutual fund
trades for all equities. Implied mutual fund trades represent a relevant instrument for institutional
holdings because individual-investor flows lead mutual funds to buy or sell stock holdings on behalf
of the individuals (Coval and Stafford (2007); Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012)).
Variation attributable to the portion of institutions’ trades driven by the idiosyncratic part
of individual-investors flows such as liquidity needs would likely satisfy the exclusion restriction
because those trades do not have any direct or indirect relationship with management’s capital
structure decisions. Because not all individual-investor flows are for idiosyncratic reasons, we
use a two-step procedure to produce our instrument. First, we remove individual-investors’ flows
associated with chasing returns and portfolio-management skills (Chevalier and Ellison (1997); Berk
and Green (2004)) and only use the residual portion of individual-investors flows to project the
implied changes in mutual fund equity holdings. Second, we assume that mutual fund managers
only change their current year stock holdings by an amount proportional to the idiosyncratic
individual-investor flows. The key logic underlying the instrument is that while actual mutual fund
trades based on individual-investor flows may be “selected” and thereby not satisfy the exclusion
restriction, by projecting proportionate (and thereby non-selected) trades from the idiosyncratic
portion of individual-investor flows, indirect correlations with other determinants of firm’s leverage
are plausibly eliminated.
Our analyses provide evidence for four new stylized facts. First, we find strong statistical
support for a negative relationship between leverage and institutional holdings. Our evidence
from the instrumental variable strategy suggests a one standard deviation increase in institutional
ownership is associated with a 0.72 standard deviation decrease in leverage. This suggests a 10
percentage point increase in institutional ownership leads to a 4.9 percentage point reduction in
leverage from an average leverage of 23.1%. This marginal effect on leverage is significantly larger
than that of other firm characteristics, such as profitability, tangibility, and the market-to-book
ratio but smaller than the marginal effect attributable to firm size.
Second, we relate our evidence examining the interrelation between institutional ownership
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and leverage to the sharp decline in aggregate leverage that began in 1992. Applying the same
instrumental variable strategy to different time periods and testing for structural breaks, we find
strong support for a strengthening of the negative interrelation following regulatory reforms enacted
between 1989 and 1992. We find the average treatment effect of institutional holdings on leverage is
much greater after the reforms than before. Residual variance tests reveal the post-reform influence
of institutional investors explains 11% of the deleveraging since 1992. Importantly, the results are
not driven by highly levered firms because quantile instrumental variable tests indicate institutional
ownership affects firms across the leverage distribution. To understand what would have happened
had the cross-section of firms not been affected by the reforms, we simulate each firm’s leverage
evolution had the reforms not occurred and find that aggregate leverage would have been eight
percentage points higher by 2013.
Third, we examine why institutional ownership and leverage developed a negative interrelation
after regulatory reforms incentivized stronger institutional governance. We find increases in institu-
tional ownership enabled firms to use less debt because firms could maintain operational efficiency
at lower levels of debt through an alternative debt structure. Evidence from three empirical tests
are consistent with this mechanism. First, we rule out an information mechanism. Because we find
firms deleverage by reducing debt and transitioning to debt associated with enhanced monitoring
and efficiency, we conclude institutions are not reducing informational frictions associated with eq-
uity issuance or credible credit worthiness. Second, we provide supporting evidence for an agency
mechanism. Using multiple definitions of firms prone to high agency costs, we consistently find
institutional ownership leads to more deleveraging in these firms. Third, using comprehensive data
on bank loans, we show deleveraging firms also see their loan covenants tighten. Improvements
in operational outcomes and equity valuation are achieved through tighter bank contracts (Nini,
Smith, Sufi (2012)). Combining this set of tests with evidence from the prior literature suggests
institutions fulfil their mandated governance role and materially benefit from facilitating firms to
attain greater operational efficiency at lower levels of debt via this alternative debt structure.
Fourth, we compare the approach taken by mutual funds with respect to leverage to that of
hedge funds. Using data on hedge fund activism, we find hedge fund activism leads to an increase
3
in leverage after hedge funds acquire 5% of a firm’s equity. When comparing economic magnitudes,
the deleveraging influence of mutual funds dominates any influence by hedge funds for managers’
to lever up. Even when mutual funds can free-ride off of the hedge funds’ tactics with respect to
leverage, we find the economic magnitude of such actions are only a small fraction of the size of
the institutional investors’ tactic of using their influence to encourage deleveraging.
To place our results in the context of other findings, we investigate several alternative explana-
tions for our findings. We show our results are robust to controls for the composition of firms and in
particular, the arrival of new tech firms in the 1990s, variations in supply and demand for corporate
debt, and booms and busts in the leveraged buyout (LBO) market. We study alternative mecha-
nisms such as crowding out of activist investors by index mutual funds and institutional investment
strategies related to valuation and beta anomalies. Such mechanisms do not explain our results.
We consider the magnitude of reverse causality in explaining the deleveraging by estimating the
extent of institutional sorting on leverage using a semi-natural experiment involving the introduc-
tion of credit default swaps (CDS) as a natural shock to leverage clienteles. Our evidence from the
difference-in-differences estimation strategy involving CDS suggests leverage clienteles exist, but
the economic magnitude is so small that it cannot contribute to the deleveraging trend.
In conclusion, our study relates to and contributes to several strands of literature. Our paper
shows the interaction between institutional holdings and firm policy extends to capital structure and
plays a meaningful role in explaining the deleveraging of U.S. firms since the 1990s. While no prior
literature has not focused on the relationship between capital structure and institutional investors
in the U.S., our findings complement a broader literature considering the legal, financial, and
institutional systems across the world, and their effect on capital structure decisions (Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)). Our findings also support the growing literature showing that
institutions affect corporate decisions. Specifically, institutional investors play a role in executive
turnover (Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001)), payout policy (Grinstein and Michaely (2005)), and
innovation (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013)).
In addition, our paper speaks to capital structure research by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender
(2008), who find traditional determinants of leverage account for relatively little of the cross-
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sectional variation in capital structure, and Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014), who find these
determinants cannot account for trends in the aggregate leverage. Our paper provides an economic
interpretation of these puzzles. Institutional investors and the SEC reforms that consolidated
institutions’ power generated structural breaks in the relative importance of leverage determinants.
In this sense, our research also informs the broader macroeconomic literature that studies the role
of the corporate sectors’ financial policy, and in particular asks if corporate leverage is excessive, for
economic and financial stability (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1990); Gertler and Hubbard (1993)).
Finally, our study informs corporate governance research. Our analysis of why and how the
deleveraging occurs augments recent research on interactions between shareholder and creditor
governance (Ivashina et al. (2008); Nini, Smith, Sufi (2012)). Our evidence that hedge funds differ
from mutual funds in their tactics with respect to leverage and minimizing agency costs supports
research suggesting corporate governance is not one-size fits all but a nuanced trade-off between
short and long-term value creation (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008); Popadak (2014)).
2 Data and Summary Statistics
Our data are drawn from the annual Compustat-CRSP database over the period extending from
1980 through 2013. We start the sample period in 1980 to coincide with the availability of insti-
tutional holdings data from SEC 13F filings. We define institutional holdings as the percentage of
shares outstanding held by institutional investment managers and the source for this data is SEC
13F filings. Institutional investment managers that exercise investment discretion over $100 million
or more are required to file 13F filings, which detail all equity holdings of more than $200,000 or
10,000 shares. An institutional investment manager is an entity that either invests in, or buys
and sells, securities for its own account. For example, mutual funds, insurance companies, pension
funds, banks, and other broker/dealers are institutional investment managers must file form 13F.
We exclude banks (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000 – 6999) and utilities (SIC
codes 4900 – 4999) to avoid capital structures governed by regulation. In line with previous capital
structure studies, we winsorize the upper and lower 1% of each variable used in the analysis to
mitigate the impact of data errors and outliers. Further, we require a firm to be in the sample for
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at least two years. The final sample consists of 106,171 firm-year observations, with non-missing
data for all of the variables used in our analysis. All variables are formally defined in Appendix A.
Institutional shareholder power evolved considerably beginning in the late 1980s (Gillan and
Starks (2007)). The first key event in the new era of institutional shareholder power is the issuance
of the Avon Letter in 1988. The letter put private pension plan trustees on notice that proxy
voting rights must be a diligently exercised aspect of fiduciary duty. Additional posturing by fed-
eral regulators and later the SEC meant that institutional investors could no longer rubber stamp
the passage of management-supported proposals; as a consequence, CalPERS and other prominent
pension funds began to submit proxy proposals and actively critique managerial practices. The sec-
ond key event in the new era of institutional shareholder power occurred when the SEC formalized
this evolution toward stronger institutional activism by reforming shareholder proxy rules. The
new SEC rules substantially reduced the barriers to communication between institutional investors
and managers, which subsequently allowed institutional investors to express their views on proxy
solicitations, organize public campaigns to pressure management, and to mount pressure against
members of the board of directors.
A key part of our analyses is to distinguish the changing role of institutional investors over
these decades in order to understand the interrelation between leverage and institutional holdings.
Figure 1 plots our two primary variables of interest – corporate leverage and institutional holdings
– over time. First, we use aggregate leverage data compiled by Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014)
from 1920 through 2010. The upper plot shows aggregate leverage increased in the post-war period,
peaked in 1992, and subsequently decreased. Second, in the lower plot, we use Compustat data
matched to SEC 13F filings of institutional equity ownership to highlight the years around the 1992
peak. Comparing the leverage trend to the institutional holdings trends in that time period begins
to suggest a pattern. There appears to be either positive correlation or little correlation between
leverage and institutional holdings in the period prior to the onset of institutional activism in the
late 1980s, but then, there is a sharp drop in leverage when institutional activism began, which is
highlighted in the area with gray shading. Finally, the negative correlation between leverage and
institutional ownership persists throughout the decades after the onset of increased shareholder
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power. While the figure provides suggestive evidence that the correlations shift over time, we rely
on our regression analyses when making inferences.
Next, we move from plots of levels to first-differences, because our statistical analyses focus on
within-firm variation over time. Figure 2 plots the annual within-firm variation in our two primary
variables of interest – book leverage and institutional holdings. The left-hand side plot shows the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentile for annual within-firm changes in leverage over time. The right-hand
plot shows 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile for annual within-firm changes in institutional ownership
over time. What is striking is how much first-difference variation there is in these variables over
time. On average, 35% of firms have a greater than 5 percentage point swing in leverage in a given
year while 37% of firms have a greater than 5 percentage point swing in institutional ownership.
While the median firm persists with a negligible change in leverage and institutional holdings over
time, examining the full distribution of first-differences reveals substantial variation in the upper
and lower quartiles. Like the main findings in DeAngelo and Roll (2015), our figures suggest
capital structure instability is prevalent. To see that such instability also extends to the percentage
of shares held by institutions is suggestive of a potentially important interrelation.
Table I complements the visual evidence from Figure 1 and Figure 2 by presenting summary
statistics on a range of key variables for the entire sample period as well as for the pre- and post-
SEC reform periods. Like the observed aggregate trends, the simple mean of the firm-specific
leverage and institutional holdings measures also change substantially over time. Average holdings
doubled from the first time period to the second time period (21.2% to 43.9%). The holdings of the
largest institutional investors in an equity also increased sharply (12.3% to 21.9%). The increases
in holdings were not limited to only the largest institutional investors as evidenced by the tripling
of the average number of institutional investors from 36 to 90. Another measure that captures this
balance across sizes of institutional investors is the ownership concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), which takes into account the relative size distribution of the investors in a given
equity. The data show the HHI decreased from 0.312 to 0.196. The remaining summary statistics
reveal other important determinants of leverage such as profitability, firm size, payout and sales
growth are consistent with prior studies (e.g., Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008)).
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Finally, to characterize the correlations between institutional holdings and leverage, Table II
presents the partial correlations from simple multivariate regressions, where we control for other firm
characteristics that affect leverage and are commonly used in the capital structure literature: firm
size, tangibility, intangibility, collateral, profitability, losses, dividend paying firm, payout, lifecycle
stage, market-to-book, investment, sales growth, asset growth, firm risk, market risk, adjusted firm
returns, Amihud’s illiquidity measure, Altman’s Z-score, and insider ownership. To account for the
strong trends, we also include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects. Panel A of Table II focuses
on the partial correlations for book leverage, Panel B focuses on the partial correlations for leverage
including leases, and Panel C for leverage in terms of book value of capital (Welch (2011)), where
cash on the balance sheet is deducted from the value of debt. In each case, the partial correlation
between leverage and institutional holding is strong and negative. The 95% confidence interval for
the mean of the partial correlation between leverage and institutional holdings is -0.15 to -0.19.
The negative partial correlation between leverage and institutional holdings also extends across
alternative definitions of institutional holdings. For example, we find negative partial correlations
of -0.038 or -0.067 when institutional holdings is redefined as the percentage of shares held by the
5 or 10 largest institutional positions in that equity, respectively.
3 Identification Strategies and Empirical Results
In this section, we use an instrumental variable design to statistically test if the negative relationship
between institutional holdings and leverage documented in our summary statistics is more than a
correlation. Our research design and empirical findings for institutional influence are presented in
Section 3.1. while Section 3.2. describes a set of empirical tests and findings that examine how
time-varying institutional influence contributes to the corporate deleveraging trend that began in
1992. The evolution of shareholder power over the last three decades suggests institutional investors’
influence strengthened significantly over this time period, so understanding the extent to which this
phenomenon statistically affects corporate leverage enlightens our understanding of firm financial
policy as well as economic and regulatory policy aimed at the stability of the corporate sector.
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3.1 The Effect of Institutional Holdings on Leverage
3.1.1 Identification Strategy. The summary statistics show institutional holdings and lever-
age are negatively correlated, yet theory is ambiguous in its predictions of the dominant direction
for the relationship. On one hand, institutional holdings and debt can have a negative interrelation.
If organizational inefficiencies must be controlled, threatening to sell shares (Admati and Pfliederer
(2009)) or fighting management through a proxy battle (Gillan and Starks (2000)) may be as effec-
tive at reducing agency costs as committing managers to pledge funds to creditors (Jensen (1986)).
Similarly, because institutions gather information and make trades based on their findings, they
may reduce informational frictions associated with equity issuance (Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein
(2010)). On the other hand, institutional holdings and leverage can have a positive interrelation.
If institutional investors enable outside shareholders to implement devices such as debt that limit
management discretion (La Porta et al. (2000)), leverage will rise when institutional ownership
increases.
To estimate if changes in institutional ownership affect corporate leverage, we use implied mutual
fund trades induced by idiosyncratic individual-investor flows as an instrument for institutional
holdings. The idea follows from work by Coval and Stafford (2007) and Edmans, Goldstein, and
Jiang (2012), who document that individual-investor outflows lead mutual funds to sell a portion
of their holdings to repay these investors. To understand the logic for why our instrument, implied
mutual fund trades, generates plausibly exogenous variation in institutional holdings, it is important
to understand why the necessary exclusion restriction for using actual individual-investor induced
trades as an instrument is not satisfied. Such a discussion should help to clarify the rationale
behind the construction of our instrument as well.
The critical argument for satisfying the exclusion restriction when using actual trades is individual-
investors’ decisions to trade mutual fund shares are not directly or indirectly correlated with the
leverage of the firms held by the mutual funds. The direct exclusion is likely satisfied, because an
investor who wishes to speculate on an individual firm’s capital structure, or relatedly the firm’s
potential bankruptcy, will trade the stock of the firm rather than a mutual fund share that only
exposes the investor to a small fraction of the firm. In contrast, the indirect exclusion may not be
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satisfied, because individual-investors’ trades may be related to the leverage of the firms held by
the mutual funds through another factor unobservable to the econometrician. For example, if a
mutual fund manager is trading in response to the individual-investors’ flows because the manager
has private information about one of his portfolio firm’s imminent capital structure change, or if a
firm’s management takes into consideration mutual fund share turnover to time the market with
equity issuances or repurchases, then actual trades would be indirectly correlated with leverage.
Therefore, instead of using actual trades, we use mutual funds’ hypothetical (or implied) trades
induced by individual-investor flows.Figure 3 helps to explain the construction of our instrument
and how such construction plausibly eliminates the previous two arguments for indirect correla-
tion that invalidated actual trades as an instrument. The data used to construct the instrument
includes: mutual fund trades, mutual fund stock holdings, stock returns, mutual fund assets under
management, and individual-investor flows. In our first step, we cleanse the individual-investor
flows of variation attributable to these investors’ chasing managerial skill and reputation (Berk and
Green (2004)) as well as chasing fund performance (Chevalier and Ellison (1997)). Specifically, we
regress quarterly individual-investor flows on a flexible form of mutual fund returns and mutual fund
fixed effects. We label the residual from these regressions as the idiosyncratic individual-investor
flow because they are meant to represent variation in individual-investors’ flows attributable to
phenomenon such as liquidity needs that have no direct or indirect relationship with corporate
leverage. In our second step, we use the actual stock holdings of the mutual fund in a given quarter
to project proportionate changes in each of the fund’s stock holdings in the next quarter based on
the magnitude of the idiosyncratic individual-investor inflows/outflows in a given quarter. The final
step aggregates all of our projected changes in stock holdings to an individual stock-year frequency.
By using implied mutual fund trades as an instrument, we eliminate the previous two ar-
guments for indirect correlation that invalidated actual flows as an instrument (i.e., when mutual
funds traded based on leverage and when managers timed mutual fund trades with equity issuances
or repurchases). Another potential concern alleviated by using implied trades as an instrument is
correlation with recent mutual fund performance. This concern is addressed by Step 2 in Figure 3
where we remove flows from chasing mutual fund returns. A final potential concern lessened with
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the construction of our instrument is correlation with unobservable market conditions. Because we
project trades one period in the future, if markets exhibit informational efficiency on an annual ba-
sis, which seems likely given evidence for informational efficiency at much shorter frequencies (e.g.,
see Ljungqvist and Qian (2014)), then implied trades are not correlated with the future information
that moves markets. This means even when an individual-investor’s flow contains some information
or sentiment (Frazzini and Lamont (2008)), the constructed instrument does not. The notion that
an instrument based on individual-investor flows is uncorrelated with future market conditions is
further supported by empirical evidence suggesting individual-investors’ trades fail to systemat-
ically predict the market (Barber and Odean (2000)). Taken together, the logic presented thus
far suggests implied mutual fund trades based on the idiosyncratic portion of individual-investor
inflows/outflows plausibly should have no relationship to executives’ capital structure choices.
We believe our construction of mutual funds’ implied trades and the aforementioned economic
arguments suggest our instrument creates plausibly exogenous variation in institutional holdings
in the following regression specification:
Leverageijt = α+ βHoldingsijt + ΓXijt + fi + δjt + ijt (1)
where observations are at the firm-year level, Leverageijt represents the book leverage ratio for
firm i in industry j in year t, Holdingsijt captures the percentage of shares outstanding held by
institutional investors, Xijt is a vector of observable firm-specific covariates, fi is a firm fixed-effect,
δjt is an industry-by-year fixed-effect, and ijt is the unobservable error component. By including
firm and industry-by-year fixed-effects, we are controlling for unobservables such as firm-specific
production capabilities and industry-year-specific sentiment that otherwise may bias our estimates.
3.1.2 Empirical Results. Table III presents our test of the effect of institutional holdings on
leverage. We find institutional holdings are a significant determinant of firms’ capital structures;
Column (1) shows a one standard deviation change in institutional holdings leads to a -0.72 standard
deviation change in leverage, on average. The estimate is significant at the 1% level. Comparisons
across the standardized coefficients reveal that this marginal effect on capital structure is signifi-
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cantly larger than that of other firm characteristics, such as profitability, payout, or investment,
while the marginal effect is smaller than that of firm size. These marginal effects translate into
economically meaningful effects as well. The point estimate suggests an average leverage decrease
of 0.49 percentage points for every percentage point increase in institutional ownership, all else
equal.
Additional tests displayed in Table III indicate we should have confidence in our inferences.
The test statistic on the instrument from the first stage regression is statistically significant at the
1% level and the F-statistic from the first stage regression is 231.9. Both of these measures are well
above recommended weak instrument thresholds and suggest the instrument is relevant. Column
(2) and Column (3) of Table III show that the primary finding is robust to alternative definitions
of leverage such as including off-balance-sheet items as well as adjusting leverage for cash. Further,
these findings are robust to a myriad of controls, which include firm size, tangibility, intangibility,
collateral, profitability, losses, dividend payments, repurchases, lifecycle stage, market-to-book,
investment, sales growth, asset growth, firm risk, market risk, adjusted firm returns, Amihud’s
illiquidity measure, Altman’s Z-score, and insider ownership.
Alternative specifications that account for other known leverage determinants such as analyst
coverage, credit ratings, external-finance-weighted growth options (Baker and Wurgler (2002)),
R&D-intensity, tax sensitivity, and geographic concentration do not qualitatively change our find-
ings. Limiting the sample to firms with longer performance histories such as at least ten or at least
twenty years of financial data does not change our results. Similarly, variations in the definition of
institutional ownership such as using only the holdings by the 5 institutions with the largest own-
ership stakes do not change our conclusions. Alternative constructions of the instrument such as
using a parametric functional form for mutual fund returns or focusing on idiosyncratic individual-
investor inflows rather than both inflows and outflows do not qualitatively change our conclusions.
We consider an alternative timing that allows for institutional investors impact on leverage to occur
in the year after they acquire the shares, and we continue to find a statistically significant negative
interrelation. Appendix Table BI shows the minor variations in point estimates from twenty-one
different robustness checks of this sort.
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The economic magnitude of the instrumented point estimate seems sensible. The point estimate
indicates a 0.71 standard deviation decrease in leverage, for a one standard deviation increase in
institutional ownership. The magnitude of this change is consequential economically. For example,
it suggests a 10 percentage point increase in institutional ownership leads to a 4.9 percentage point
reduction in leverage from an average leverage of 23.1%. While the average firm-year observation
in our sample experiences only small positive changes in institutional ownership year-over-year,
the average change in institutional ownership for the 40% of observations in the upper and lower
quintiles is a 10 percentage point change in institutional ownership. Appendix Table BII repeats
the instrumental variable regression analyses for firms-year observations according to the quantile
of the size of change in institutional ownership. Consistent with intuition, the firms experienc-
ing large changes in institutional ownership in a given year are driving the instrumental variable
point estimate for the full sample. For the two quintiles where the average change in institutional
ownership is less than 1.1%, the point estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero but for
the quantiles where the point estimate is larger than 3.3% , the point estimates are statistically
significant.
As a final check of the robustness of our identification strategy, we implement a placebo test
that checks for spurious correlation. Although the exclusion restriction cannot be tested in a strict
statistical sense, our placebo test helps to assuage concerns about information inefficiency and/or
unobservable firm performance persistency driving our results. Specifically, we run a placebo test,
in which we project changes in mutual funds’ stock holdings back in time rather than forward.
Intuitively, if our instrument was spuriously correlated with some form of persistency, then, using
the subsequent portfolios should produce similar point estimates. Our results from the placebo test
suggest our instrument is valid. When examining changes in leverage that pre-date the placebo
instrument, we find no effect. The null result from the placebo test implies our construction
of implied mutual trades extracts the desired idiosyncratic variation stemming from individual-
investor flows and hence, that our instrument is likely uncorrelated with the error term in our main
specification. Appendix Table BIII shows the results from the placebo test analysis.
Taken together, all of these tests indicate our instrumental variable analyses are internally valid,
13
but it is worthwhile to discuss if our analyses are potentially externally valid. The explanatory power
of the first stage is high as evidenced by the R2 of 50% in Table III and the statistical significance of
the instrument in predicting institutional holdings. Because the instrument is broadly predictive, it
appears reasonable to conclude the estimates are not stemming from a special subsample of firms.
Furthermore, because individual-investors’ flows occur at various points in time across various
mutual funds, it appears reasonable to conclude the estimates are not driven by a unique year or
fund. Such arguments suggest our results generalize, and therefore, are likely to be externally valid.
It is important, however, to recognize that the point estimate and inferences provide guidance about
an average effect over the sample period which spans from 1980 through 2013. Changing the time
period may alter the average effect. In the next subsection, we examine the extent to which the
evolution of institutional shareholder power may generate heterogeneity in the effect over time.
3.2 The Effect of Institutional Holdings on Aggregate Leverage Trends
Evidence from the previous subsection demonstrates increases in institutional ownership lead to
decreases in leverage, on average within a firm over time. While this finding informs our under-
standing of the interrelation between institutional investors and leverage, additional analyses are
necessary to learn about the dynamics of the interrelation over time and its contribution to trends
in aggregate leverage. Knowing these details are important for understanding economic and reg-
ulatory policy. For example, if the SEC’s regulatory reforms that strengthened the potential for
institutional activism represent a regime shift where activism substitutes for debt, this external-
ity should also be taken into consideration in debates about the costs and benefits of regulating
institutional activists.
In this section, we use the within-firm evidence to shed light on the observed trends in aggregate
leverage. Specifically, we examine if changes in institutional shareholder activism explain part of
the heterogeneity in the effect of institutional ownership on leverage over time. Recall from Figure 1
that the leverage of unregulated U.S. firms exhibit an inverted-V shape. Leverage steadily increased
until peaking in 1992, and subsequently, it sharply decreased.
We test whether the unprecedented rise in institutional ownership, and importantly, the power
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of institutions to influence management, can account for a significant part of the abrupt decline
in aggregate leverage. While institutional ownership began its ascent before 1992, the role for
institutions in influencing managerial decisions was limited until that time period. Beginning in
the late 1980s, institutional shareholder power evolved considerably and two key events helped to
strengthen the potential role for institutions to influence managerial decisions (Gillan and Starks
(2007)). The first key event is the issuance of the Avon Letter that occurred in 1988 and the second
key event is the change in SEC regulations governing the proxy process that occurred in 1992.
To test the hypothesis that the increased power of institutional shareholders explains part
of the downtrend in aggregate leverage, we implement an extension of the instrumental variable
identification strategy described above. If the two key events that strengthened institutions’ power
are influencing the aggregate leverage trend, we would expect to see stronger treatment effects
after the events. We split the full sample period which spans from 1980 through 2013 into three
subsamples, 1980 through 1989, 1989 through 1992, and 1992 through 2013. We estimate Eq.
(1) for each subsample. This subsample estimation produces valid estimates of the conditional
effects of the other variables at these different values but cannot in itself show the time periods
are different. To test if the time periods are different, we perform Chow’s test, which determines
whether the coefficients estimated over one group of the data are equal to the coefficients estimated
over another.
Table IV provides evidence to suggest the strengthening of shareholder power accounts for a
substantial portion of the heterogeneity in the effect of institutional holdings on leverage. Table IV
shows that in the time period prior to the key events, the effect of institutional holdings on leverage
is statistically indistinguishable from 0, yet in the time periods when the potential for institutional
shareholder activism is stronger, the point estimates are larger and statistically significant. After
the second key event – the SEC reform in 1992 – a standard deviation increase in institutional
holdings leads to 1.15 standard deviation decrease in leverage. During the time period between the
first and second key event (1989 through 1992), the coefficient estimate is statistically insignificant
but this is the first time that the point estimate shifts from a positive to a negative sign. That the
post-reform era point estimate is so much stronger than the pre-period is striking. Importantly,
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the Chow test further confirms that the coefficients estimated over the two groups are not equal
to one another. This suggests while there may have been some gray area between 1989 and 1992
in terms of institutions’ full impact, by 1992 the consolidation of institutional power appears to be
fully felt.
Because Table IV suggests there is significant heterogeneity in the effect of institutional owner-
ship on leverage within a firm over time, our next aim is to quantify the economic significance of
this heterogeneity and relate it to the macroeconomic trends. We do this by performing two tests.
First, we generate a counterfactual aggregate leverage simulation and second, we analyze the full
distribution of starting leverages to understand where institutions exert the most influence.
Figure 4 plots our counterfactual simulation as well as actual aggregate leverage from 1980
through 2013. To generate this figure, we simulate leverage evolutions for each individual firm and
then, we sum across all of the individual firm simulations to create an aggregate counterfactual
series. We make the following assumptions when creating the counterfactual simulations. First, we
assume the strengthening of institutional power did not occur, so the marginal effect of institutional
holdings is set to what it was prior to 1992. Second, we assume the average marginal effects for
other determinants of leverage such as firm size, profitability, and growth options were unaffected
by the change in strength of institutional power. This second assumption of no spillovers seems
reasonable because the coefficients did not change substantially on the additional covariates across
the subsamples. And third, we assume firms exhibit the same degree of unexplained idiosyncratic
behavior over the period from 1992 to 2013 that we actually observe in the data. This assumption
means we use the actual firm-year specific residuals in our simulations.
The results from the simulation exercise depicted in Figure 4 suggest the aggregate leverage of
unregulated U.S. firms would have been eight percentage points higher by 2013 without the influence
of institutions on managements’ capital structure decisions. The actual aggregate leverage in 2013
for unregulated U.S. firms is 21% whereas in the counterfactual simulation aggregate leverage is
29%. Our simulations suggest leverage would have continued on an upward trend but with a smaller
slope had it not been for the evolution of activism. Our examination of the residual unexplained
variance in leverage after 1992 echoes the counterfactual simulation. It suggests that the influence
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of institutional investors accounts for 11% of the residual variation for the time period after 1992.
One way to interpret this result is that institutional power is an important determinant of the
deleveraging trend but other factors such as taxes may be an even more important determinant.
Finally, to test the hypothesis that institutional holdings are only important for leverage when
leverage is in the high range of the distribution, we explore the entire distribution of effects over
time using an instrumental variables quantile regression framework. This design is a methodological
improvement over studies that employ traditional quantile regressions, because when the identifying
assumptions hold, inferences are more credible. For the inferences from the quantile instrumental
variable regression to be credible, an additional rank similarity assumption is necessary. The rank
similarity condition means that each firm’s rank in the conditional outcome distribution is invariant
in expectation, regardless of the status of the change in institutional holdings. There are no formal
tests available to validate an assumption of rank similarity, but controlling for observable covariates
helps to achieve rank similarity. The quantile regression specification is the same as in Equation
(1) but varies across quantiles, τ .
Q(Leverageijt|τ) = α(τ) + β(τ)Holdingsijt + γ(τ)Zijt + fi(τ) + δjt(τ) + ijt(τ) (2)
Observations are at the firm-year level. Leverageijt represents the leverage ratio for firm i in
industry j in year t, Holdingsijt captures the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional
investors, Zijt is a vector of observable firm-specific covariates, fi is a firm fixed-effect, δjt is
an industry-by-time fixed-effect, and ijt is the unobservable error component. The vector of
observable covariates is the same as in previous specifications and includes firm size, tangibility,
intangibility, collateral, profitability, losses, dividend paying firm, payout, lifecycle stage, market-
to-book, investment, sales growth, asset growth, firm risk, market risk, adjusted firm returns,
Amihud’s illiquidity measure, Altman’s Z-score, and insider ownership.
Table V presents the quantile instrumental variable estimates for the effect of institutional hold-
ings on leverage. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A show the quantile and the associated coefficient
estimate for β(τ). Column (3) shows the leverage associated with quantile τ while Column (4)
shows our inference for the new leverage after a 10 percentage point increase in leverage, all else
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equal, respectively. The instrumental variables quantile regression estimates suggest the impor-
tance of institutional investors varies over the leverage distribution. Consider the 33rd percentile,
which represents a book leverage of only 9.4%; for this quantile, a standard deviation increase in
institutional ownership is associated with a statistically significant 0.511 standard deviation de-
crease in leverage. In contrast, for the 66th percentile, which represents a book leverage of 29.2%,
a standard deviation increase in institutional ownership is associated with a statistically significant
0.595 standard deviation decrease in leverage. The 10th and 25th percentiles, which encompass
leverage levels below 5% show no significance, yet high leverage levels show an event more mean-
ingful change brought about by institutions. The 95th percentile is more than double the estimate
at the median.
4 The Role of Institutions in Affecting Leverage Change
The empirical evidence from the previous sections indicates institutional ownership and corpo-
rate leverage have a negative interrelation that became economically meaningful after a change in
regulatory conditions incentivized institutional investors to monitor firms more. But why would
increases in institutional ownership lead to a decrease in leverage? The popular press often details
how hedge funds and private equity funds increase their ownership stakes in firms to influence firm
executives to increase debt levels. By increasing debt levels, executives are thought to improve
operational efficiency while hedge funds and private equity funds lever their returns. Theoretically,
the hedge funds use their power to facilitate additional debt that disciplines mangers’ use of free
cash flow (La Porta et al. (2000)). Yet we observe the exact opposite effect empirically, so what
mechanism could produce the opposite effect and which institutional tactic dominates that of hedge
funds or mutual funds?
While it is very difficult to tease out a precise mechanism, in this section, we present evidence
from three empirical tests that begin to explain how and why the deleveraging occurs. First, we
examine the composition of the firms’ deleveraging. Is the deleveraging coming from changes in
debt or equity? If it is coming from debt, what kind of debt? Second, we examine the characteristics
of the firms where the deleveraging effect is strongest. Do these firms display a high potential for
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agency conflicts or informational frictions? Third, we examine the relationship between institutional
ownership and creditor governance. Is the debt that remains in the firm’s capital structure after
deleveraging the type of debt that benefits institutional investors? Finally, we use our empirical
setting to understand which institutional approach dominates – that of hedge funds or mutual
funds.
The empirical evidence is consistent with a nuanced agency mechanism. In particular, we find
increases in institutional ownership enabled firms to use less debt because the firms could maintain
operational efficiency at lower levels of debt through an alternative debt structure. The rationale
supporting this finding is as follows. Institutions want managers to reduce arm’s-length, public
debt and transition toward monitoring-intensive, bank debt. By concentrating the debt structure
in bank debt, which leads to improved operational performance and equity valuation when agency
conflicts arise (Roberts and Sufi (2009); Nini, Smith, Sufi (2009); Nini, Smith, Sufi (2012)), the
institutional investors are satisfying their mandated fiduciary duties and positioning their portfolios
for superior returns.
Examples of mutual funds following such a tactic can be found on their websites as well as in
publicly disclosed court documents. Specifically, Fidelity, one of the largest mutual fund providers,
offers two “Leveraged Company Stock Funds” to their retail clients. Fidelity markets these funds
in its’ highest risk category, suggesting that institutional investors do not view increased lever-
age in as favorable terms as hedge funds do. Similarly, while it is hard to know what happens
at behind-the-scenes, one-on-one meetings between institutional investors and management, docu-
ments uncovered through the legal discovery process shed some light. For example, records from
a court case involving HCA reveal its expert financial advisor told the CFO when he was con-
templating increasing his firm’s leverage that such actions were not warranted. HCA’s financial
advisor argued with greater leverage, HCA’s valuation as a public company would be pressured
due to HCA’s long-term institutional investors’ aversion to the increased risk inherent in a levered
situation (Merrill Lynch (2006)).
While our evidence on the mechanism is mostly suggestive, it points to a direction for fu-
ture research – to understand the interaction between shareholder and creditor governance and its
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implications for economic outcomes. The details of our empirical specifications and findings are pre-
sented in Section 4.1. which examines the exact debt and equity instruments used to accomplish
the deleveraging, in Section 4.2. which examines firm characteristics associated with deleverag-
ing, inSection 4.3. which illustrates the relationship between institutional influence and creditor
governance, and in Section 4.4 which compares hedge fund and mutual funds’ tactics.
4.1 Composition of the Deleveraging
In this subsection, we investigate the nature of the deleveraging by examining how firms change
their capital structure in response to an increase in institutional ownership. First, we want to
determine if the deleveraging occurs through changes in debt, equity, or both. Second, we seek to
understand if the deleveraging involves changes in the types of creditors and/or debt instruments
used by the borrowers. Examining the composition of the deleveraging in such ways helps to shed
light on the potential for an agency cost mechanism or an informational frictions mechanism.
The theoretical literature predicts that when informational frictions are alleviated firms are
more likely to choose seasoned equity or public debt issuances as sources of external financing.
Because managers know more about the true condition of the firm, when informational frictions
are high investors believe that managers are taking advantage of over-valuation when issuing eq-
uity. As a result, investors discount the new equity issuance, so if institutional investors through
their trades and dissemination of information can alleviate such frictions, the empirical prediction
is more equity issuance and lower leverage (Myers and Majluf (1984)). A key trade-off highlighted
by the theoretical literature on debt structure is the choice of arm’s-length public debt vs. closely-
monitored bank debt (Diamond (1991)). If institutional investors through their increased power
post reform alleviate reputational frictions the firm faces for other creditors, the empirical predic-
tion is a movement from bank debt to public debt (Rajan (1992)). In contrast, if institutional
investors’ role as active monitors led firms to specialize in the type of debt shown to enhance oper-
ational efficiency, then, the empirical prediction is a movement from arm’s-length debt in favor of
monitoring-intensive bank debt (Nini, Smith, Sufi (2012)).
To study the average change in the underlying debt and equity structure, we use an instrumental
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variable framework similar to what we used for leverage, but we replaces leverage with the specific
debt or equity component:
LeverageComponentijt = α+ βHoldingsijt + ΓXijt + fi + δjt + ijt (3)
where observations are at the firm-year level, LeverageComponentijt represents a component of
the leverage ratio for firm i in industry j in year t, Holdingsijt captures the percentage of shares
outstanding held by institutional investors, Zijt is a vector of observable firm-specific covariates,
fi is a firm fixed-effect, δjt is an industry-by-year fixed-effect, and ijt is the unobservable error
component.
To examine debt and equity changes, we define debt and equity issuance in accordance with
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008). Equity issuance is the product of the split-adjusted change
in shares outstanding and the split-adjusted average stock price, normalized by total assets in the
previous year. Consequentially, a firm is an equity issuer if ∆Equity > 1%, and an equity repur-
chaser if ∆Equity < −1%. Debt issuance is defined similarly and includes long-term plus short-term
debt, normalized by total assets in the previous year. This procedure adjusts for new issuances that
result from rolled-over debt. This procedure also distinguishes between equity issuance related to
the exercise of employee stock options and actual seasoned equity offerings.
Table VII Panel A provides estimates of the composition of the debt vs. equity change. The
main finding is that the deleveraging primarily occurs through debt changes rather than equity
changes. Specifically, we find a statistically significant but economically small reduction in equity
repurchases, and no meaningful change in equity issuance. In contrast, we find firms change their
debt in an economically meaningful way across the board. We find statistically significant reductions
in long-term debt, reductions in new debt issuance, and reductions in debt through early retirement.
In each case, our estimate is significant at the 1% level. For example, the -0.62 for debt issuances
is interpreted to mean a one standard deviation change in institutional holdings leads to a -0.62
standard deviation change in new debt issuances, on average. The additional statistics reported
in the table suggest we should be confident in these inferences. The t-statistic on the instrument
from the first stage regression is statistically significant at the 1% level and the F -statistic from the
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first stage regression is 43.3. Both of these measures are well above recommended weak instrument
thresholds and suggest the instrument is relevant. In addition, these findings are robust to a myriad
of controls, which include firm size, tangibility, intangibility, collateral, profitability, losses, dividend
payments, repurchases, lifecycle stage, market-to-book, investment, sales growth, asset growth, firm
risk, market risk, adjusted firm returns, Amihud’s illiquidity measure, Altman’s Z-score, and insider
ownership.
The finding that firms deleverage primarily through decreased debt begins to rule out an infor-
mation asymmetry mechanism driving the negative interrelation between leverage and institutional
ownership, but further testing is needed. If, however, the firm’s debt is more concentrated in arm’s
length-debt that would also be consistent with an asymmetric information story assuming the in-
stitutions are reducing frictions associated with the firms’ reputations (Rajan (1992)). As such,
we examine the details of the debt composition. Firm-level debt structure variables are gathered
from Capital IQ, which pulls their data from a variety of sources including firms’ 10-Ks, 10-Qs,
Annual Reports, 424 and S-3 prospectuses. Capital IQ decomposes total debt into mutual exclu-
sive debt types, which we aggregate into five categories. Our categories include commercial paper,
term loans, bonds and notes, capital leases, and other borrowings. Appendix A details the exact
formulas we use to classify the debt types. For example, drawn credit lines are a part of the other
borrowing category.
Table VII Panel B provides estimates of the composition of the debt change. We find institu-
tional investors exert their influence through reductions in bonds, notes, and commercial paper.
Capital leases, term loans, and other borrowings, which include drawn credit lines, do not mean-
ingfully change. Because heavily-monitored bank debt is not reduced while arm’s length debt is
reduced, we can rule out an asymmetric information mechanism. As Rajan (1992) demonstrates, an
asymmetric information mechanism predicts that institutions ability to convey information about
the firm’s credit worthiness leads to more arm’s-length debt, and we do not find this. Overall,
the specific debt components suggest a mechanism that would require more diligent monitoring
facilitated by bank debt such as an agency mechanism. Any agency mechanism, however, does not
appear to be as straightforward as institutional investors’ role as active monitors directly substitut-
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ing for the disciplinary role of debt. Instead, the concentration of debt among bank debt suggests
the potential for an agency mechanism. As such, the next two subsections probe this hypothesis.
4.2 Potential for Agency Conflicts
In this subsection, we analyze firm characteristics that capture heterogeneity in potential agency
costs within our sample of firms over time. Potential agency costs associated with excessive man-
agerial risk aversion and career concerns may be exacerbated by high leverage. In these cases,
institutional ownership coupled with a credible threat of intervention may be as or more effec-
tive than committing managers to pledge funds to creditors as a way of promoting efficiency and
financially sound investments and acquisitions.
To measure agency costs, we consider several definitions. First, we define a high agency cost
firm as a large market capitalization firm with few growth opportunities. Our second definition
of a high agency cost firm examines low sales growth but high SG&A expense firms. Empirically
this measure is a new empirical measure, but the intuition comes from the accounting literature
that demonstrates SG&A expenses increase more rapidly when demand increases than they decline
when demand decreases. This definition captures the idea that economically inefficient managers
are likely to increase SG&A costs too rapidly by adding employees and awarding bonuses too quickly
when sales go up and to decrease SG&A costs too slowly by delaying deductions to payroll, travel,
and entertainment expenses when sales go down. Our third definition of high agency cost firms
looks at acquisitions, which evidence indicates may be a way managers grow out of trouble and
protect their careers (Gormley and Matsa (2011)). We define high agency cost firms as those with
two consecutive years of non-core acquisition expenses, which may approximate these undesirable
managerial tendencies.
To test if such an agency mechanism underlies the negative relation between institutional own-
ership and leverage, we extend the instrumental variable framework to include interactions with
various firm and investor characteristics. In particular, we focus on the extent to which the negative
relationship is driven by the mechanisms most affected by the SEC reforms such as institutional
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activism and monitoring. The exact specification is as follows:
Leverageijt = β1Charijt ×Holdingsijt + β2Charijt + β3Holdingsijt + ΓXijt + fi + δjt + ijt (4)
where the specification is the same as Eq. (1) except for the inclusion of Charijt, which is a
dummy variable indicating a firm displays the high potential for agency conflicts characteristic, and
Charijt × Holdingsijt, which is the associated interaction term. When present, the controls and
fixed effects are interacted with the Charijt as well. Because Charijt ×Holdingsijt is endogenous,
it is instrumented for with our original instrument, mutual funds’ implied trades, interacted with
Charjit. Because of the interaction terms, the regression coefficients no longer indicate the change
in mean response with a unit increase in the covariates, all else equal. Instead, the mean response
is dependent on the given level of the characteristic under study.
Columns (1) through (3) of Table VII reveal the extent to which an agency mechanism drives
the substitution between leverage and institutional ownership. Across each definition of agency
costs, the effect of institutional ownership on leverage is stronger economically in high agency
cost firms. To put the statistics in perspective, recall the average point estimate across all firms
suggests a 10 percentage point increase in institutional ownership leads to a 4.9 percentage point
reduction in leverage, all else equal. For high agency cost firms, a 10 percentage point increase
in institutional ownership reduces leverage between 5.0 and 5.7 percentage points. Because the
importance of agency costs remains robust across the three alternative definitions, each of which
captures a nuance of managerial potential for agency conflicts, we are confident our conclusion that
an agency mechanism is economically meaningful explanation for the substitution is not fragile to
a single definitional assumption. The remaining statistics presented in the columns further support
that our inferences are valid. The statistics reveal both instruments are relevant, as evidenced by a
high first-stage t-statistics and non-trivial adjusted R2 statistics; the instruments are statistically
strong as evidenced by the first-stage F -statistics greater than 10.
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4.3 The Relationship between Institutional Ownership and Creditor Gover-
nance
While the previous two subsections provide evidence consistent with the deleveraging occurring
more in firms with high potential for agency conflicts and primarily through a reduction in arm’s
length-debt in favor of bank debt, to rationalize this tactic, we would hope to observe active
monitoring by banks in the firms with increased institutional ownership. From prior research,
we know active monitoring by banks is associated with improved equity valuations and greater
operational efficiency (Nini, Smith, Sufi (2012)). We test the hypothesis that bank creditors are
engaging in greater governance, even when firms are deleveraging, by analyzing the covenants banks
place in their contracts after a firm experiences an increase in institutional ownership.
Specifically, we use Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan data to examine the contractual use of net
worth covenants, financial covenants, and total covenants used in bank loans and other creditor
facilities. Our primary specification is the same instrumental variable approach used throughout the
paper where institutional ownership is instrumented for using implied mutual fund trades induced
by idiosyncratic individual-investor flows. The only difference is that covenant usage rather than
leverage is the dependent variable in the specification.
Columns (2) through (4) of Table VIII reveal the extent to which covenant usage changes fol-
lowing an increase in institutional ownership. Across the board, the effect of increases institutional
ownership is statistically significant increases in covenant usage. For example, a one standard
deviation increase in institutional ownership leads to a 0.44 standard deviation increase in total
covenants. While this means a firm would need at least a 10 percentage point increase in insti-
tutional ownership for a new covenant to be added given the variation in the data; the economic
magnitude also seems plausible given that the firms with 10 percentage point changes in institu-
tional ownership are the ones experiencing the greatest deleveraging and likely renegotiating the
terms of their debt. This is important because it seems unreasonable to expect banks to write
stronger contracts in response to institutional investors rather what seems plausible is that institu-
tions through their influence to encourage both the use of bank debt and the acceptance of stronger
contractual terms.
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The remaining statistics presented in the columns of Table VIII provide evidence that the
inferences about covenant usage are valid. The statistics suggest the instrument is relevant, as
evidenced by a high first-stage t-statistics and non-trivial adjusted R2 statistics; similarly, the
instruments are statistically strong as evidenced by the first-stage F -statistics greater than 10.
Finally, the results our robust to limiting the sample to only firms in the Thompson Reuters’
Dealscan database. The limited sample results are reported in Panel B and remain statistically
similar to those for the whole sample. An additional take-away from Panel B is that the Dealscan
set of firms are similar to the whole sample of firms as Column (1) reveals the point estimate for
the change in leverage is within the 95% confidence interval of that for the full sample.
4.4 Comparing Hedge Fund and Other Institutional Investors’ Tactics
The empirical evidence presented in the previous sections suggests increased institutional ownership,
primarily by mutual funds and pension funds, leads to a decrease in corporate leverage through a
reduction in arm’s-length debt and that institutions, motivated by SEC mandates, are influencing
leverage decisions in order to reduce potential agency conflicts and enhance equity valuations. In
contrast to the evidence presented, prior research on hedge fund activism suggests hedge funds
follow the exact opposite tactic with respect to corporate leverage (Brav et al. (2008)). In this
section, we compare hedge funds tactics with that of other institutional investors, primarily mutual
funds, to understand which institutional tactic dominates.
To understand the interaction between hedge fund and mutual fund tactics, we use a sample of
1,139 hedge fund activism events. We examine the firm-year where a hedge fund first files a 13D
form. A 13D form indicates a hedge fund increased its size to exceed the 5% disclosure threshold,
but also that the fund intends to use the stake to intervene in the way the target firm is run
(since the fund filed a 13D and not a 13G form). The 13D filings data are borrowed from Brav
et al. (2008). We also examine the course of a hedge fund activism campaign using the date the
hedge fund sells its equity stake in the firm. Our primary specification is the same instrumental
variable approach used throughout the paper where institutional ownership is instrumented for
using implied mutual fund trades induced by idiosyncratic individual-investor flows. The main
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addition to the specification is to include the hedge fund activism event as well as an interaction
term with institutional holdings.
Table IX Panel A provides empirical evidence that hedge funds follow an alternative tactic
with regards to leverage than that of our institutional investors. We find a statistically significant
positive interrelation between hedge fund activism and corporate leverage. The inclusion of hedge
fund activism events in our analyses does not meaningfully change our point estimates for the
institutional investors influence over leverage. On average, a one standard deviation increase in
institutional ownership still leads to a 0.72 standard deviation decrease in leverage while the effect
of a hedge fund activism event is much smaller in economic magnitude.
Examining the interaction between hedge fund tactics and that of other institutional investors,
we find some other institutional investors appear to free-ride off the hedge funds’ strategy, but the
magnitude of this interaction suggests free-riding is 1/10th of the size of the deleveraging tactic. In
combination, these results suggest that hedge fund activism may attenuate the influence of other
institutional investors at times but the strategy of encouraging greater deleveraging dominates for
most institutional investors. Panel B of Table IX shows that these results are robust to alternative
sample definitions as well as an alternative definition of hedge fund activism.
5 Discussion
In the previous sections, we provide evidence suggesting a causal relationship between institutional
holdings and leverage contributed to the corporate deleveraging trend in the U.S. that began in
1992. We further show our instrumental variable estimation approach is robust to alternative
statistical specifications and placebo tests. In this section, we discuss our results in the context of
contemporaneous trends and potential explanations for the deleveraging. First, we examine and
show our results are not attributable to the composition of firms and in particular, the arrival of
new tech firms in the 1990s, to booms or busts in the LBO market, and to variations in supply
and demand for corporate debt. Second, we consider alternative mechanisms for our findings such
as crowding out of activist investors by index mutual funds and institutional investment strategies
related to valuation and beta anomalies. We find they cannot fully explain our findings. Third, we
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examine the extent to which institutional sorting contributes to an interrelation between leverage
and institutional ownership, and we find it cannot account for the deleveraging.
There are large variations in the number of publicly listed firms because of waves of new IPOs
during some periods such as in the dot-com boom and waves of de-listing in some other periods such
as during LBO booms and stock market crashes. As Fama and French (2001) point out, the large
variation over time in the number of firms raises important issues for the study of firm financial
policy. For example, newly listed firms have lower profitability but more growth opportunities which
may affect aggregate leverage trends. If the composition of firms or a change in firm characteristics
were driving our results, we would expect our estimated effect to change when using a constant
number of firms sample or when using only firms with many years of financial data. Panel E of
Appendix Table BI shows that our results do not change when limiting our analysis to only firms
that were alive in our sample for more than 10 or 20 years or when using a constant sample size.
This suggests the arrival of new tech firms in the 1990s and booms and busts in the LBO market
are not driving our results.
The deleveraging trend associated with institutional ownership may be the artefact of con-
current variation in supply of other debt such as government bonds or mortgage debt leading to
the fluctuations observed over time. As Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014) document, U.S. fed-
eral government debt issuance affects corporate financial policies through an impact on investors’
portfolio allocations, and government debt is negatively correlated with corporate debt. We test
whether this is a contemporaneous effect or if it is directly related to the effect we find via in-
stitutional owners’ portfolio choice. We would not expect a direct effect because our instrument
isolates idiosyncratic variation in individual-investors flows to institutions. Nevertheless, to test
this alternative, we follow Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014) and limit our sample to years when
government debt issuance is low. Consistent with our baseline instrumental variable results, we
find when the potential for government debt crowding out corporate debt is at its lowest, greater
institutional ownership statistically significant decreases leverage. This result is contained in Panel
E of Appendix Table BI. This suggests a government debt crowding out effect is independent of
the effect we isolate.
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The deleveraging trend associated with institutional ownership may be the artefact of simulta-
neous variation in demand for corporate debt through a risk-preference or debt-vs-equity channel.
As Baker and Wurgler (2002) illustrate, when investor demand for corporate debt is low, a catering
hypothesis suggests managers will cater to investors demand and issue more equity. Because we
find firms deleverage by reducing debt rather than issuing equity, this suggests the interrelation we
observe is distinct from a catering hypothesis. Consistent with this distinction, when we include in
our analysis the measure of investor-demand-induced variation in external financing costs defined
by Baker and Wurgler (2002), our point estimates remain similar and statistically significant. This
result is contained in Panel A of Appendix Table BI.
An alternative hypothesis for the mechanism driving the negative interrelation between insti-
tutional ownership and leverage is that the influx of passive institutional investors is crowding out
activist hedge fund investors that prefer firms take on higher leverage. The evidence, however, does
not support this mechanism. First, the timing is off. Our results suggest the deleveraging trend did
not begin until 1992 when SEC regulatory reforms were enacted that incentivized greater institu-
tional governance, yet Vanguard launched its first index mutual fund in 1976. Further, there were
no noteworthy changes in assets pledged to index funds in the early 1990s. Second, the hypothesis
suggests management should have more slack today than in prior decades. In contrast, research on
CEO tenure and style suggest managerial slack is less today than in prior decades (Bertrand and
Schoar (2003); Kaplan and Minton (2006)). Third, following the procedure outlined by Cremers
and Petajisto (2009), we identify that our effect still holds when examining stocks with large shares
of active mutual fund investors. These results are reported in Panel E of Appendix Table BI. This
suggests our findings are not a story of passive investors crowding out smart hedge funds.
A second alternative hypothesis for the mechanism driving the negative interrelation between
institutional ownership and leverage is institutional investment strategies related to valuation and
beta anomalies. Because mutual fund investors tend to chase returns over time and across funds,
fund managers are thought to care more about outperforming during expansionary business cylces
than underperforming during recessionary periods. This response will increase demand for high-
beta stocks and reduce their required returns. As a test for high-beta effects, we limit our sample
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to recessionary market years. If a high-beta effect were driving our results, we would not expect
to observe the negative interrelation in bear market years, yet as reported in Panel E of Appendix
Table BI we still find a significant negative interrelation during bear market years. As a test for
valuation effects, we consider an alternative construction of our instrument that excludes individual-
investor redemptions. If large outflows by individual investors that shifted stock prices away from
fundamental value were driving our estimates, then relying on only individual-investor inflows
would eliminate this confounding dynamic. Yet, as is reported in Panel E of Appendix Table BI,
our results remain statistically significant and similar. Hence, these tests suggest our findings are
not driven by valuation or beta anomalies.
While our instrumental variable approach mitigates endogeneity attributable to reverse causal-
ity, one may still be interested in knowing the extent to which reverse causality could contribute
to the deleveraging trend. To test the reverse causality argument and in particular if institutional
shareholders vary in their preferences for firms with high or low leverage, we analyze the response
of institutional investors to a natural break in leverage clienteles that occurs when CDS contracts
first trade on a firm. Instead of only investing in firm’s with a particular capital structure, CDS
contracts allow institutional investors to hedge the risk-return trade-off attributable to capital
structure from investing in the firm. Appendix C explains this test in more detail and presents the
results from implementing it. The take-away from the test is there is some evidence for leverage
clienteles, but the economic magnitude of the clienteles is so small (i.e., 1/10th of that stemming
from institutional investors to leverage) that it cannot meaningfully explain even a small portion
of the deleveraging trend.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we address three important and related questions. The first question examines the
interrelation between institutional ownership and capital structure decisions. The second ques-
tion investigates whether a series of regulatory changes that incentivized institutional investors to
actively engage in firm governance affected this interrelation. The third question assesses what
mechanism drives such an interrelation. Because corporate leverage plays a critical role in the
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stability of the economy, our answers to these questions provide important stylized facts relevant
to academic research and policymaking.
First, we find increases in institutional ownership, primarily by mutual funds, account for
within-firm declines in leverage over time. We reach this conclusion using implied mutual fund
trades induced by idiosyncratic individual-investor flows as an instrument for institutional hold-
ings. Our point estimates suggest a 10 percentage point increase in institutional ownership leads
to a 4.9 percentage point decline in leverage, on average. Second, we find the magnitude of insti-
tutional investors’ effect on corporate leverage varies over time. Supporting the hypothesis that
institutional investors contributed to the deleveraging trend that began in 1992, our estimates
increase significantly after regulatory reforms incentivized stronger institutional governance. To
quantify the economic importance of institutional investors’ influence post the reforms, we simu-
late counterfactual leverage paths for all firms and find aggregate corporate leverage would have
been eight percentage points higher today without institutional investors’ influential role.
The notion that institutional investors such as mutual funds apply pressure to reduce leverage
may seem surprising at first. Hedge funds and private equity funds are often glamorized in the busi-
ness press for exerting their influence over executives to increase corporate debt levels and thereby
leverage their funds’ returns. We find, however, that increases in ownership by other institutional
investors such as mutual funds and pension funds is the dominant force in the deleveraging trend.
Even when institutions can free-ride off of hedge funds strategies with respect to leverage, few do.
Our third set of findings suggest why these institutional investors, such as mutual funds, may ra-
tionally prefer firms to deleverage. Our evidence indicates the deleveraging occurs through debt not
equity and through arm’s-length debt not closely-monitored bank debt. Because these institutional
investors can influence firms’ capital structure but not operational decisions, they encourage firms
to concentrate their debt in the type of debt most likely to reduce agency costs, improve operational
performance, and enhance equity valuation. Supporting this notion, we find the deleveraging effect
is stronger in firms with high potential for agency problems, and increased institutional ownership
is associated with active monitoring of loans by banks. Because banks exert the behind-the-scenes
pressure necessary to improve firm operational and investment policies, these institutional investors
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realize improved equity valuation and fulfill their mandated fiduciary duties through overall lower
leverage.
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Figures and Tables
 
Source: CRSP firms covered in Compustat or Moody’s Industrial Manuals from 1920 through 2010. 
    
Source: Compustat firms matched to SEC 13-F Filings from 1980 to 2013. 
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Figure 1. Capital Structure and Changes in Equity Ownership: The upper plot shows annual
aggregate leverage as a black, solid line for all firms in the CRSP database that are also covered
either in Compustat or Moody’s Industrial Manuals from 1920 through 2010. The onset of institu-
tional shareholder activism is shaded in gray. Financial firms and utilities are excluded. The annual
leverage ratio is defined as aggregate total debt to aggregate financial capital per Graham, Leary,
and Roberts (2014). The lower plot focuses in on the period post 1980. The lower plot depicts
leverage as a navy, solid line for all firms in the Compustat database, institutional ownership as a
red, dashed line, and the onset of institutional shareholder activism is shaded in gray. Financial
firms and utilities are excluded. The annual leverage ratio is defined as total debt to total assets per
common convention. Institutional shareholder activism began with the submission of governance
related proxy proposals in the late 1980s and extended to firm performance and managerial actions
by 1992 when the SEC formally adopted rules giving institutional shareholders and activists broad
freedom to communicate with each other, express their views on proxy solicitations publicly, and
put together organized campaigns to bring pressure to bear on corporate targets.
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Figure 2. Interquartile Range of Annual Changes in Capital Structure and Equity Ownership:
The left-hand side plot shows the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile for annual within-firm changes in
leverage over time. The right-hand plot shows 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile for annual within-
firm changes in institutional ownership over time. Because of the first-difference definition, 5%
should be interpreted as a 5 percentage point change over the year. The time period begins in 1980
to coincide with the years in which SEC 13-F filings of institutional ownership can be matched to
Compustat data.
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Firm A Firm B Firm C
Given: Mutual fund's holdings at t $2M $3M $5M
Receives $1M inflow from individual investors at t
Step 1: Isolate idiosyncratic part of individual-investor flows
  Investors chasing returns
  Investors chasing reputation/skill
  Focused-funds correlated with leverage
Result:   Estimate $500,000 of $1M inflow is idiosyncratic
Step 2: Project "implied" t + 1  trades from idiosyncratic flow at t
  $1M inflow ($500,000 idiosyncratic) $0.1M $0.15M $0.25M
Then: Aggregate implied t + 1  trades across all funds to firm-level
  Remove flows from fund returns 
  Remove flows from fund fixed effects 
  Drop funds that hold firms in one industry
  as in Chevalier and Ellison (1997)
  as in Berk and Green (2004)
Figure 3. Implied flow-induced Trading Example: Assume a mutual fund holds equity in Firm
A, Firm B, and Firm C at time t equal to $2 million, $3 million, and $5 million, respectively, and
has $10 million total in assets under management at time t. Next, assume the mutual fund receives
an inflow from individual investors of $1 million. For our instrument to be plausibly exogenous, we
need the implied t + 1 trades to be correlated with actual trades but uncorrelated with Firm A,
Firm B, or Firm C’s next period leverage. By assuming equal proportion mutual fund trades, we
bypass the potential confounding effect of mutual fund managers allocating more (or less) of the
investors inflows to a Firm that is likely to have higher (or lower) leverage in the future. Because
large positive or negative fund flows are not allocated randomly to mutual funds, a first step is
needed to bypass the potentially confounding effects of smart money. To isolate the portion of the
mutual funds’ trades driven by idiosyncratic reasons such as the individual investors’ liquidity needs
or lumpy inflows from bonuses and tax returns, we remove the proportion of the variation in flows
that can be explained by mutual fund returns as well as the proportion of the variation in flows that
can be explained by mutual portfolio management skills (Berk and Green (2004)). To accomplish
this, we estimate a non-linear relationship between actual flows and fund returns as in Chevalier
and Ellison (1997) and include mutual fund fixed effects to control for management skills. Using the
fitted values from these regressions, we calculate the residual unexplained variance in actual flows.
We use this residual flow (i.e., the idiosyncratic individual-investor flows) to project the implied
trade at time t+ 1. The final rows of the figure shows that instead of the$1 million inflow from the
top of the figure, if 50% of the individual-investor flow variation is explained by performance and
skills, we only project the mutual fund trades attributable to the remaining $500,000 in unexplained,
idiosyncratic individual-investor flows. Finally, we aggregate all the implied mutual funds trades
from all mutual funds to the firm-year level.
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Figure 4. Simulated Counterfactual: The plot depicts actual leverage as a red, solid line for
nonfinancial public firms and simulated leverage for nonfinancial public firms as a blue, dashed
line. The simulation sets the influence of institutional investors on leverage to levels observed
before the 1992 SEC proxy reform. The grey shaded area represents the 90% confidence interval
for the simulated counterfactual.
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Table I Summary Statistics
This table reports means and standard deviations (SD) for a number of firm-specific covariates from 1980
through 2013 (Full Sample), 1980 through 1991 (Pre-SEC Proxy Reform Sample), and 1992 through 2013
(Post-SEC Proxy Reform Sample). Each sample consists of firm-year observations for all U.S. incorporated,
non-regulated firms (i.e., excluding financial firms and utilities) with a positive market capitalization, positive
assets, and non-missing values for all covariates. Accounting data are obtained from the Compustat-CRSP
merged database, and institutional holdings data are obtained from Thomson-Reuters via 13F SEC filings.
Appendix A provides precise definitions for the variables.
Summary Statistics Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Institutional Holdings 36.5% 29.3% 21.2% 19.9% 43.9% 30.2%
Block Holdings 11.7% 12.9% 5.8% 8.7% 14.6% 13.6%
Number of Institutional Owners 72.8 112.2 35.9 69.4 90.4 123.9
Number of Blockholders 1.4 1.4 0.7 0.9 1.7 1.5
Holdings, Top 1 Institution 7.4% 5.5% 5.4% 5.2% 8.3% 5.5%
Holdings, Top 5 Institutions 18.8% 12.9% 12.3% 10.2% 21.9% 12.8%
Holdings, Top 10 Institutions 24.7% 17.5% 15.5% 13.1% 29.1% 17.6%
Ownership Concentration HHI 0.234 0.258 0.312 0.311 0.196 0.219
Leverage 23.1% 21.0% 26.2% 20.2% 21.6% 21.2%
Leverage including Leases 33.2% 25.9% 35.5% 25.0% 32.0% 26.3%
Market Leverage 23.7% 23.8% 29.3% 24.4% 21.0% 23.0%
Leverage in terms of Book Value of Capital 32.0% 29.6% 35.5% 27.7% 30.3% 30.3%
Firm Size 5.41 2.01 5.05 2.01 5.58 1.99
Market-to-book 1.58 1.52 1.31 1.29 1.71 1.60
Lifecycle Stage -0.32 1.63 -0.01 1.02 -0.47 1.83
Profitability 6.3% 21.5% 8.8% 17.8% 5.2% 22.9%
Losses 19.6% 39.7% 16.7% 37.3% 21.0% 40.7%
Dividend Paying Firm 34.6% 47.6% 46.1% 49.8% 29.1% 45.4%
Payout 1.6% 3.6% 1.0% 2.2% 1.9% 4.0%
Tangibility 28.5% 22.2% 33.4% 21.3% 26.1% 22.2%
Collateral 44.2% 24.3% 53.3% 20.9% 39.8% 24.6%
Intangibility 9.5% 15.3% 3.5% 8.1% 12.4% 17.0%
Investment 31.1% 38.3% 28.7% 37.0% 32.3% 38.9%
Sales Growth 15.2% 47.3% 14.4% 45.8% 15.6% 48.0%
Asset Growth 13.0% 40.1% 12.1% 36.4% 13.5% 41.7%
Firm Beta 0.83 0.63 0.82 0.61 0.83 0.64
Market Risk 5.3% 5.9% 4.3% 4.3% 5.8% 6.5%
Adjusted Firm Returns -6.0% 10.7% -12.0% 6.5% -3.0% 11.0%
Altman's Z-Score 1.34 2.43 1.86 2.00 1.09 2.57
Amihud Liquidity 10.83 45.33 24.50 71.25 4.29 21.78
Observations
Full Sample 1980 to 1991 1992 to 2013
106,171 34,389 71,782
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Table II Partial Correlations
Panel A reports partial correlations from multivariate regressions relating book leverage and institutional
holdings, Panel B reports for leverage including off-balance sheet operational leases, and Panel C for leverage
defined as the ratio of financial debt to the book value of capital. The sample consists of firm-year observations
for all U.S. incorporated, non-regulated firms. The vector of firm controls include firm size, tangibility,
intangibility, collateral, profitability, losses, dividend paying firm, payout, lifecycle stage, market-to-book,
investment, sales growth, asset growth, firm risk, market risk, adjusted firm returns, Amihud’s illiquidity
measure, Altman’s Z-score, and insider ownership. Appendix A provides precise definitions for the variables.
Panel A. Partial Correlations with Leverage
Institutional Holdings -0.170***
(0.011)
Holdings, Top 5 Institutions -0.038***
(0.008)
Holdings, Top 10 Institutions -0.067***
(0.009)
Block Holdings -0.002
(0.006)
Ownership Concentration HHI 0.073***
(0.005)
Adjusted R 2 67% 66% 66% 66% 66%
Panel B. Partial Correlations with Leverage including Leases
Institutional Holdings -0.148***
(0.011)
Holdings, Top 5 Institutions -0.036***
(0.007)
Holdings, Top 10 Institutions -0.060***
(0.008)
Block Holdings -0.005
(0.006)
Ownership Concentration HHI 0.057***
(0.005)
Adjusted R 2 70% 69% 70% 69% 70%
Panel C. Partial Correlations with Leverage in terms of Book Value of Capital
Institutional Holdings -0.173***
(0.012)
Holdings, Top 5 Institutions -0.037***
(0.008)
Holdings, Top 10 Institutions -0.067***
(0.009)
Block Holdings 0.002
(0.006)
Ownership Concentration HHI 0.078***
(0.006)
Adjusted R 2 61% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Firm-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 106,171 106,171 106,171 106,171 106,171
Unique Firms 10,383 10,383 10,383 10,383 10,383
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Table III The Effect of Institutional Holdings on Leverage
This table explores institutional investors’ role in aggregate leverage trends using the instrumental variable
specification outlined in Eq. (1). The instrument for institutional holdings is mutual funds’ implied trades.
The vector of firm controls include firm size, tangibility, intangibility, collateral, profitability, losses, dividend
paying firm, payout, lifecycle stage, market-to-book, investment, sales growth, asset growth, firm risk, market
risk, adjusted firm returns, Amihud’s illiquidity measure, Altman’s Z-score, and insider ownership. ***, **,
and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses.
IV
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable = Leverage
Leverage including 
Leases
Leverage in terms of 
Book Value of Capital
Institutional Holdings -0.718*** -0.543*** -0.659***
(0.144) (0.123) (0.145)
Firm Size 0.821*** 0.507*** 0.706***
(0.090) (0.077) (0.090)
Tangibility 0.077*** 0.028 0.004
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Intangibility 0.099*** 0.084*** 0.073***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Collateral 0.146*** 0.197*** 0.175***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Profitability -0.021** -0.059*** -0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Losses -0.014*** -0.015*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Dividend Paying Firm -0.091*** -0.080*** -0.111***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Payout 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.022***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Market-to-book 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.02
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Additional Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 231.9 231.9 231.9
T-stat on Instrument in First Stage 9.76 9.76 9.76
First-Stage R 2 49% 49% 49%
Adjusted R 2 68% 72% 63%
Observations 106,171 106,171 106,171
Unique Firms 10,383 10,383 10,383
IV Robustness (Alt. Leverage Measures)
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Table IV Institutional Investors’ Role in Aggregate Leverage Trends
This table explores institutional investors’ role in aggregate leverage trends by testing if SEC regulatory
changes which enhanced institutions’ power strengthened the relationship from institutional holdings to
leverage. Panel A reports standardized coefficient estimates from instrumental variable regressions of leverage
on institutional holdings for time periods before and after the SEC reform as outlined in Eq. (1). The various
subsamples relate to time periods near the SEC reform. Institutional shareholder activism began with the
submission of governance related proxy proposals in the late 1980s and extended to firm performance and
managerial actions by 1992 when the SEC formally adopted rules giving institutional shareholders and
activists broad freedom to communicate with each other, express their views on proxy solicitations publicly,
and put together organized campaigns to bring pressure to bear on corporate targets. The pre-SEC proxy
reform period includes 1980 through 1991; the post-SEC proxy reform period includes 1992 through 2013.
The vector of firm controls include firm size, tangibility, intangibility, collateral, profitability, losses, dividend
paying firm, payout, lifecycle stage, market-to-book, investment, sales growth, asset growth, firm risk, market
risk, adjusted firm returns, Amihud’s illiquidity measure, Altman’s Z-score, and insider ownership. ***, **,
and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses.
Dependent Variable = Leverage
All Years 
(1980 - 2013)
Pre Onset of 
Institutional 
Shareholder 
Activism 
(1980-1989)
Post Onset to 
Pre SEC 
Reform 
(1989-1992)
Post SEC 
Reform 
(1992-2013)
Institutional Holdings -0.718*** 0.290 -0.411 -1.146***
(0.144) (0.402) (0.374) (0.310)
Chow Test F-stat Pre vs. Post SEC Reform 30.443***
Sum of Squared Residuals 33,609.2 24,270.3
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 231.9 54.9 12.2 43.3
T-stat on Instrument in First Stage 9.76 3.33 4.40 5.38
First-Stage R 2 49% 33% 14% 44%
Adjusted R 2 68% 76% 86% 71%
Observations 106,176 24,187 9,381 71,616
Unique Firms 10,383 4,373 3,286 7,816
Institutional Investors' Role in Aggregate Leverage Trend – Subsample Tests
7,031.0
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Table V Heterogeneity in Observed Treatment Effects
This table reports standardized coefficient estimates across various quantiles from instrumental variable
quantile regressions as is outlined in Eq. (2). In all specifications, the instrument for institutional holdings
is mutual funds’ implied trades. The vector of firm controls include firm size, tangibility, intangibility,
collateral, profitability, losses, dividend paying firm, payout, lifecycle stage, market-to-book, investment,
sales growth, asset growth, firm risk, market risk, adjusted firm returns, Amihud’s illiquidity measure,
Altman’s Z-score, and insider ownership. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses.
Quantile () Leverage ()
0.95 63.1%
0.90 51.4%
0.85 44.5%
0.80 39.5%
0.75 35.4%
0.66 29.2%
0.50 19.8%
0.33 9.4%
Panel B. Tests for Heterogeneous Relationship
95% Test
Statistic
Constant Effect ( < 0.25 equals  > 0.75) (9.11)***
Constant Effect ( < 0.33 equals  > 0.66) (12.31)***
Constant Effect ( < 0.5 equals  > 0.5) (16.53)***
5.7%
-0.519*** 16.1%
Estimate of Leverage () After 10% Increase in 
Institutional Holdings, All Else Equal
55.4%
44.4%
38.1%
33.8%
30.2%
24.9%
Panel A. Instrumental Variables Quantile Regressions
D = 0.965, Reject Equality
D = 0.954, Reject Equality
Coefficient at  on
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Distributional 
Equality
D = 0.947, Reject Equality
Institutional Holdings
-0.890***
-1.075***
-0.981***
-0.797***
-0.718***
-0.595***
-0.511***
43
Table VI The Structure of the Deleveraging
This table explores how institutional investors affected the equity and debt structure of the unregulated firms
following the SEC regulatory changes. Panel A reports standardized coefficient estimates from instrumental
variable regressions of debt and equity changes on institutional holdings. Panel B presents an even more
detailed analysis of the debt structure using Capital IQ’s capital structure files. In all specifications, the
instrument for institutional holdings is the hypothetical annual change in mutual fund holdings implied
by previously disclosed holdings as is outlined in Eq. (3). The vector of firm controls include firm size,
tangibility, intangibility, collateral, profitability, losses, dividend paying firm, payout, lifecycle stage, market-
to-book, investment, sales growth, asset growth, firm risk, market risk, adjusted firm returns, Amihud’s
illiquidity measure, Altman’s Z-score, and insider ownership. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported
in parentheses.
Panel A. Deleveraging through Debt and Equity Changes
Dependent Variable = Short-Term Long-term Issuance
Issuance 
(Net 
Retirements) Buybacks
Issuance 
(Net 
Buybacks)
Institutional Holdings -0.390 -1.554*** -0.616* -0.405** -0.266** 0.213
(0.277) (0.398) (0.371) (0.185) (0.132) (0.290)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3
T-stat on Instrument in First Stage 5.38 5.38 5.38 5.38 5.38 5.38
Adjusted R 2 47% 69% 42% 8% 23% 36%
Observations 71,616 71,616 71,616 71,616 71,616 71,616
Unique Firms 7,986 7,986 7,986 7,986 7,986 7,986
Panel B. Deleveraging through Debt Structure Changes in Detail
Dependent Variable = 
Bonds and 
Notes
Commercial 
Paper Terms Loans
Capital 
Leases
Other  
Borrowings
Institutional Holdings -1.688*** -2.828*** 0.378 -0.043 0.671
(0.495) (0.982) (0.330) (0.375) (0.515)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 20.7 20.7 20.7 20.7 20.7
T-stat on Instrument in First Stage 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55
Adjusted R 2 61% 22% 51% 49% 32%
Observations 40,398 40,398 40,398 40,398 40,398
Unique Firms 5,939 5,939 5,939 5,939 5,939
The Composition of Deleveraging
EquityDebt
Debt
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Table VII Tests of Underlying Mechanisms
This table shows which mechanisms relate institutional holdings and leverage. The exact specification is as
in Eq. (4). In all variants of the specification, the instrument for institutional holdings is mutual funds’
implied trades and instrument for the characteristic is the same instrument interacted with the characteristic
of interest. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses.
Dependent Variable = Leverage Defn. 1. Defn. 2. Defn. 3.
Institutional Holdings -0.698*** -0.698*** -0.706***
(0.146) (0.144) (0.147)
Institutional Holdings x Agency Conflicts -0.151** -0.014 -0.114
(0.060) (0.071) (0.228)
Agency Conflicts 0.275*** 0.061* 0.093
(0.085) (0.036) (0.169)
Additional Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat Instrument 1 263.3 187.0 216.5
First-stage R 2 Instrument 1 49% 49% 50%
T-stat on Instrument 1 8.14 9.77 9.70
First-stage F-stat Instrument 2 100.3 17.9 18.4
First-stage R 2 Instrument 2 68% 36% 55%
T-stat on Instrument 2 18.09 3.15 0.61
Adjusted R 2 68% 68% 68%
Observations 106,171 106,171 106,171
Unique Firms 10,383 10,383 10,383
High Potential for Agency Conflicts
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Table VIII Institutional Investors and the Governance Role of Creditors
This table explores the hypothesis that institutional investors encourage the use of bank debt rather than
arm’s length debt because of the important governance role these creditors play. Panel A reports standardized
coefficient estimates for all firms whereas Panel B reports estimates only for firms included in Thomson
Reuters’ Dealscan database. The exact specification is as in Eq. (1). In all variants of the specification,
the instrument for institutional holdings is mutual funds’ implied trades. ***, **, and * represent statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level,
are reported in parentheses.
Panel A. All Firms
Dependent Variable = Leverage
Net Worth 
Covenants
Financial 
Covenants
Total 
Covenants
Institutional Holdings -0.718*** 0.640*** 0.342* 0.448**
(0.144) (0.235) (0.184) (0.189)
Additional Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 231.9 231.9 231.9 231.9
T-stat on Instrument in First Stage 9.76 9.76 9.76 9.76
First-Stage R 2 49% 49% 49% 49%
Adjusted R 2 68% 40% 57% 56%
Observations 106,171 106,171 106,171 106,171
Unique Firms 10,383 10,383 10,383 10,383
Panel B. Firms in Thomson Reuters' Dealscan Database
Dependent Variable = Leverage
Net Worth 
Covenants
Financial 
Covenants
Total 
Covenants
Institutional Holdings -0.643*** 1.220** 1.354*** 1.455***
(0.234) (0.527) (0.399) (0.407)
Additional Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.1
T-stat on Instrument in First Stage 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.92
First-stage R 2 45% 45% 45% 45%
Adjusted R 2 75% 56% 67% 67%
Observations 39,987 39,987 39,987 39,987
Unique Firms 5,254 5,254 5,254 5,254
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Table IX Comparison of Institutional Investors and Hedge Funds
This table explores if the institutional investors in our sample which include mutual funds, pension funds,
and insurance companies have different viewpoints than hedge funds do with respect to what a firm’s leverage
ratio should be. Panel A reports standardized coefficient estimates for all firms whereas Panel B reports
estimates only for firms that were ever targeted by an activist hedge fund. The exact specification is as in
Eq. (1). In all variants of the specification, the instrument for institutional holdings is mutual funds’ implied
trades. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses.
Panel A. All Firms (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable = Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage
Institutional Holdings -0.718*** -0.715*** -0.720*** -0.716***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.145) (0.144)
Hedge Fund Campaign 0.084***
(0.025)
Hedge Fund Activist Crosses 5% Threshold 0.058** 0.065***
(0.023) (0.024)
Hedge Fund Activist x Institutional Holdings 0.088***
(0.017)
Additional Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 231.9 231.9 231.9 231.9
T-stat on Instrument in First Stage 9.76 9.76 9.76 9.76
First-Stage R 2 49% 49% 49% 49%
Adjusted R 2 68% 68% 68% 68%
Observations 106,171 106,171 106,171 106,171
Unique Firms 10,383 10,383 10,383 10,383
Panel B. Firms Targeted by Activist Hedge Funds (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable = Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage
Institutional Holdings -0.687** -0.681** -0.691** -0.692**
(0.319) (0.317) (0.320) (0.322)
Hedge Fund Activism Campaign 0.042*
(0.022)
Hedge Fund Activist Crosses 5% Threshold 0.023 0.034
(0.020) (0.022)
Hedge Fund Activist x Institutional Holdings  0.065***  
(0.022)
Additional Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 463.9 463.9 463.9 463.9
T-stat on Instrument in First Stage 4.51 4.51 4.51 4.51
First-Stage R 2 57% 57% 57% 57%
Adjusted R 2 66% 66% 66% 66%
Observations 18,214 18,214 18,214 18,214
Unique Firms 1,139 1,139 1,139 1,139
Comparison of Institutional Investors and Hedge Funds
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A Variable Definitions
Institutional Holdings and Block Holdings data comes from Thomson-Reuters via 13F SEC
filings. All ownership percentages are derived based on the number of shares outstanding and
correspond to calendar dates. A blockholder is defined as an institutional investor with more than
5% holdings as filed through 13D, 13F, or 13G filings. The ownership concentration Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) is defined to take into account the relative size distribution of the investors
in a given equity. The HHI index approaches zero when the equity of a firm is occupied by a large
number of investors of relatively equal size and reaches its maximum of one when it is controlled
by a single investor.
Leverage = DLTT+DLCAT
Leverage including Leases =
DLTT+DLC+XRENT+
∑5
t=1
MRCt
(1+Kd)
t
AT , where Kd is the cost of debt
capital, which we set equal to 10% following Rauh and Sufi (2010).
Leverage in Terms of Book Value of Capital = DLTT+DLC(DLTT+DLC+SEQ+MIB) as discussed in
Welch (2011).
Market Equity = MEQ = PRCC×CSHO, where PRCC is calendar year in order to match
calendar year institutional holdings reports.
Market Leverage = DLTT+DLCDLTT+DLC+MEQ
Firm Size = Log(AT )
Market Value of Assets (MVA) = MEQ+DLC +DLTT + PSTK − TXDITC
Market-to-book = MVAAT
Lifecycle Stage = RETAT
Profitability = OIBDPAT
Losses is a dummy variable taking the value of one if OIBDP is negative and zero otherwise.
Dividend Paying Firm is a dummy variable taking the value of one if DV C is positive and
zero otherwise.
Payout DV C+PRSTKCAT
Tangibility = PPENTAT
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Collateral = INV T+PPENTAT
Intangibility = INTANAT
Investment = ((CAPX−SPPE)−(CAPXt−1−SPPEt−1))PPENTt−1
Sales Growth = (REV T−REV Tt−1)REV Tt−1
Asset Growth = (AT−ATt−1)ATt−1
Firm Beta is the calendar year beta computed from daily CRSP data where the betas are
adjusted to reflect the spillover of returns that often occur around non-trading days.
Market Risk is the calendar year market risk computed from daily CRSP data, where market
risk and risk to an individual industry are disaggregated.
Adjusted Firm Returns is each firm’s annual return adjusted by the CAPM return using
the firm’s beta, the 10-year Treasury bond yield, the realized return on the S&P 500 index.
Altman’s Z-Score = 3.3× PIAT + .99× SALEAT + 1.4× REAT + 1.2× (ACT−LCT )AT + .6× MEQLLT
Amihud’s Illiquidity is the monthly ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar volume average
over the prior calendar year. (Amihud (2002))
Insider Holdings data comes from Thomson-Reuters cleansed non-derivative transaction and
insider activity data extracted from SEC Forms 3, 4, 5, and 144. Note, this data is only available
beginning in 1986.
CDS data comes from Markit and coverage begins in 2001. CDS introduction is the first year
in which CDS contracts are introduced on a firm. High CDS depth is a dummy variable taking
the value one if that equity has above median coverage quality in a calendar year, which Markit
approximates using the number of unique daily reports on a name.
Implied Mutual Fund Trades is the firm-specific, calendar-year annual dollar change in
mutual fund holdings implied by idiosyncratic individual-investor inflows and outflows. To construct
this variable, we combine quarterly data on mutual fund holdings from Thomson Reuters and
quarterly data on stock returns, assets under management, and fund flows from CRSP. First,
we apply definitions from Sirri and Tufano (1998) to isolate individual investor inflows to and
outflows from each mutual fund in a given quarter. Next, we cleanse the individual-investor flows
of variation attributable to individual-investors’ chasing managerial skill and reputation (Berk and
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Green (2004)) as well as chasing fund performance (Chevalier and Ellison (1997)). Specifically, we
regress quarterly individual-investor flows on a flexible form of mutual fund returns and mutual fund
fixed effects. We label the residual from these regressions as the idiosyncratic individual-investor
flow because they are meant to represent variation in individual-investors’ flows attributable to
phenomenon such as liquidity needs that have no direct or indirect relationship with corporate
leverage. Then, we use the actual holdings of the mutual fund in a given quarter to project changes
in individual stock holdings in the next quarter based on the magnitude of the idiosyncratic,
individual-investor flows and trading volume for that stock in the given quarter. We limit the set
of mutual funds projected to change their individual stock holdings to those that do not experience
a greater than 200% change in assets under management, and we limit the set of mutual funds to
those that do not specialize in specific industries. The industry exclusion, which is defined at the
two-digit SIC level, mitigates concerns that investors’ flows are correlated with industry-specific
business cycles. Finally, we sum the projected changes in stock holdings from the mutual funds
that remain in the set to an individual stock-year frequency. Figure 3 illustrates this procedure.
To clarify our calculation, consider the formula for firm i in year y based on quarter q investor
flows. Let ImpliedTradei,y =
∑4
q=1
[∑m
j=1
Fj,q×SHARESi,j,q−1×PRCi,q−1
MTAj,q−1×V OLi,q
]
, where Fj,q is the total
idiosyncratic individual-investor flow (positive or negative) experienced by fund j in quarter q,
MTAj,q−1 is mutual fund j’s total assets at the end of the previous quarter, SHARESi,j,q−1 ×
PRCi,q−1 is the dollar value of fund j’s holdings of stock i, and V OLi,q is the total dollar trading
volume of stock i in quarter q. The summation is over funds j. To mitigate the impact of any flow
on a stock’s liquidity, we scale by trading volume V OLi,q.
Our construction of implied mutual fund trades from idiosyncratic individual-investor flows
builds on recent research (Coval and Stafford (2007); Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012)). The
use of implied rather than actual trades differs from Coval and Stafford (2007). The estimation
of idiosyncratic flows rather than outflows greater than 5% differs from Edmans, Goldstein, and
Jiang (2012). Like both of these papers, we seek an instrument that is unrelated to the firm’s
fundamentals or managerial decisions.
High Agency Firm is a dummy variable taking the value of one if a firm is large and has few
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growth opportunities (i.e., market capitalization greater than the 80th percentile and market-to-
book ratio less than the 20th percentile in a given calendar year).
High Agency Firm (SG&A Definition) is a dummy variable taking the value of one for
firms with managers that tend to overspend on SG&A costs without legitimate economic reasons.
We proxy for this form of agency costs using small firms with SG&A expenses greater than the
80th percentile and sales growth less than the 20th percentile in a given calendar year.
High Agency Firm (M&A Definition) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if a
firm had positive acquisition expenses (Compustat variable AQC) in each of the previous two years
and SDC M&A data indicates the acquisitions were not of firms in the same primary 3-digit SIC
code as the acquirer. Hence, they were non-core acquisitions.
Short-term Debt =DLTTAT
Long-term Debt = DCAT
Debt Issuance = DLTISAT
Debt Issuance (Net Retirements) = DLTIS−DLTRt−1AT
Equity Buybacks = I
[
SSTK−PRSTKCt−1
AT < −0.025
]
Equity Issuance (Net Buybacks) = SSTK−PRSTKCt−1AT
Capital IQ Debt Structure Variables are constructed using the Capital IQ Capital Struc-
ture Debt quarterly dataset which is available beginning in 1989. We use the variable capitalstructuresubtypeid
to identify the component of the debt structure and the variable dataitemvalue scaled by unittypeid
to populate five different components of the debt structure. When there are multiple filings for the
same debt structure item we select filingflagcompany==2 for last filing. When capital structure
items are the same item but coded differently because of descriptive differences across 10Ks, annual
reports, etc..., we select the dataitemvalue from the last chronological date among the items with
filingflagcompany indicating a last filing. We then aggregate the unique, fine-grained components
of the capital structure into the following categories at an annual frequency.
BN = (capitalstructuresubtypeid = 4) = bonds and notes,
CP = (capitalstructuresubtypeid = 1) = commercial paper,
TL = (capitalstructuresubtypeid = 3) = term loans,
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CL = (capitalstructuresubtypeid = 5) = capital leases,
OTR = (capitalstructuresubtypeid = 2|6|7|9) = drawn credit line + trust securities +
other borrowings + preferred securities.
Hedge Fund Activism Campaign is a dummy variable taking the value of one if an activist
hedge fund campaign is in progress. If the hedge funds exit date is not reported to the press, it is
assumed to exit with 24 months of filing its 13D form with the SEC. Brav et al. (2008) provided
this data.
Hedge Fund Activist Crosses 5% Threshold is a dummy variable taking the value of one
in the year when a hedge fund crosses the 5% threshold that requires the fund to report its position
to the SEC in a 13D filing. Brav et al. (2008) provided this data.
Recessionary Year is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the U.S. economy was
officially in a recession for 2 or more quarters in that year according to the NBER’s Business Cycle
data. The data are available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html.
Low Government Debt Year is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the U.S.
government debt issuance decreased from the previous year. The data are available at http:
//www.treasury.gov/Pages/default.aspx.
Active Institutional Investor Firm is a dummy variable taking the value of one if a firm’s
mutual fund investors are active investors as defined in Cremers and Petajisto (2009). Intuitively,
for each mutual fund Petajisto creates an active share that reveals the percentage of the portfolio
that differs from the passive benchmark index. Any fund with an active share greater than 60%
is considered active. Any stock where the funds on average have an active share greater than 60%
are active. The data are available at http://www.petajisto.net/data.html.
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B Additional Tables
Table BI The Effect of Institutional Holdings on Leverage
This table provides evidence from several robustness checks of the estimated effect of institutional holdings
on leverage using the instrumental variable specification outlined in Eq. (1). The instrument for institutional
holdings is mutual funds’ implied trades. The vector of firm controls is the same as in the baseline specification
in Table III. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses.
IV Estimate Observations
First-stage 
F-stat
T-stat on 
Instrument in 
First Stage
Panel A. Robustness Checks with Additional Covariates
  Analyst Coverage -0.706*** 106,176 231.9 9.76
(0.150)
  Variation in External Financing Costs -0.677*** 87,903 69.8 8.36
(0.166)
  Credit Ratings -0.733*** 106,176 231.9 9.76
(0.144)
  Tax Rates -0.645*** 101,835 59.2 9.46
(0.147)
  Research & Development Activity -0.713*** 106,176 231.9 9.76
(0.145)
  Domestic Only Operations -0.719*** 106,176 231.9 9.76
(0.145)
  Percentage Held by Top 5 Institutions -0.479*** 106,176 92.87 10.18
(0.100)
  Percentage Held by Top 10 Institutions -0.508*** 106,176 58.09 10.67
(0.104)
  Percentage Held by Blockholders -0.516*** 106,176 65.47 7.61
(0.118)
  Without Fund Fixed Effects -0.710*** 106,176 230.96 10.03
(0.140)
  Using Linear Functional Form for Fund Returns -0.693*** 106,176 233.54 11.06
(0.125)
  With Funds Experiencing >200% Change in AUM -0.852*** 106,176 339.83 10.03
(0.151)
  Without Individual-investor Redemptions -0..537*** 106,172 89.70 20.28
(0.062)
  Lagged Institutional Holdings  -0.619*** 93,777 87.29 9.34
(0.145)
  Lagged Institutional Holdings and All Covariates  -0.599*** 93,777 82.07 9.06
(0.153)
  Limiting Sample to Firms with 10 Years of Data -0.798*** 76,225 224.81 8.18
(0.176)
  Limiting Sample to Firms with 20 Years of Data -0.758*** 37,677 28.02 5.29
(0.263)
  Limiting Sample to Constant Number of Firms -0.616*** 52,559 37.04 6.09
(0.225)
  Limiting Sample to Recessionary Years  -0.490* 15,170 221.25 4.57
(0.289)
  Limiting Sample to Low Government Debt Years  -0.421*** 50,049 97.91 9.89
(0.126)
  Limiting Sample to Firms with Active Mutual Funds -0.956*** 22,803 52.22 7.23
(0.198)
Panel C. Robustness Checks with Alternative Instrument Construction
Panel B. Robustness Checks with Alternative Definitions of Institutional Holdings
Panel D. Robustness Checks with Alternative Timing
Panel E. Robustness Checks with Alternative Samples
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Table BII Institutional Characteristics in Relation to Estimated Effects
This table explores which characteristics of the institutional holders drive the estimated effect of institutional
holdings on leverage. Panel A provides evidence from subsample regressions, where subsamples are defined by
size quantiles for the percentage point change in institutional holdings. Each regression uses the instrumental
variable specification outlined in Eq. (1), where instrument for institutional holdings is mutual funds’ implied
trades. The vector of firm controls is the same as in the baseline specification in Table III. In all variants of
the specification, the instrument for institutional holdings is mutual funds’ implied trades and instrument
for the characteristic is the same instrument interacted with the characteristic of interest. ***, **, and *
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the firm level, are reported in parentheses.
Average Treatment Effect Driven by Large Changes in Institutional Holdings 
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4 Quantile 5
Mean Change in Institutional Holdings in Quantile -8.3% -1.1% 0.6% 3.3% 12.0%
Median Change in Institutional Holdings in Quantile -6.1% -1.0% 0.5% 3.2% 9.5%
Dependent Variable = Leverage
Institutional Holdings -2.401* -0.518 -1.749 -0.864** -0.492**
(1.382) (0.744) (1.243) (0.389) (0.225)
Additional Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 456.0 427.1 180.6 182.2 473.1
T-stat on Instrument in First Stage 1.85 1.91 1.78 3.92 5.84
First-Stage R 2 48% 51% 50% 61% 57%
Adjusted R 2 71% 68% 70% 72% 70%
Observations 16,693 16,410 16,522 16,668 16,917
Unique Firms 6,856 6,815 6,677 6,388 6,383
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Table BIII Placebo Test of Institutional Holdings on Leverage
This table explores institutional investors’ role in aggregate leverage trends using a placebo instrumental
variable specification. The regression specifications follows that outlined in Eq. (1) except rather than
instrumenting for institutional holdings using mutual funds’ implied forward-looking trades, we use mutual
funds’ implied backward-looking trades. This variation is a falsification test that the instrument is not
picking up some underlying unobservable economic trend. The vector of firm controls is the same as in the
baseline specification in Table III. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses.
Original IV Placebo IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable = Leverage Leverage
Leverage including 
Leases
Leverage in terms 
of Book Value of 
Institutional Holdings -0.718*** -0.160 -0.177 -0.093
(0.144) (0.699) (0.614) (0.731)
Firm Size 0.821*** 0.487 0.288 0.368
(0.090) (0.417) (0.366) (0.436)
Tangibility 0.077*** 0.070*** 0.023 -0.004
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023)
Intangibility 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.088*** 0.079***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Collateral 0.146*** 0.173*** 0.215*** 0.203***
(0.020) (0.039) (0.035) (0.041)
Profitability -0.021** -0.022** -0.059*** -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Losses -0.014*** -0.01 -0.012* 0.006
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Dividend Paying Firm -0.091*** -0.098*** -0.085*** -0.118***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Payout 0.017*** 0.011 0.007 0.016*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Lifecycle Stage -0.073*** -0.080*** -0.148*** -0.076***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Market-to-book 0.034*** -0.01 0.002 -0.025
(0.013) (0.056) (0.049) (0.058)
Additional Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 231.9 169.3 169.3 169.3
T-stat on Instrument in First Stage 9.76 1.76 1.76 1.76
First-Stage R 2 49% 49% 49% 49%
Adjusted R 2 68% 72% 72% 63%
Observations 106,171 106,171 106,171 106,171
Unique Firms 10,383 10,383 10,383 10,383
Placebo IV Robustness (Alt. Defn.)
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C Additional Discussion of Potential for Reverse Causality
In this appendix, we examine the alternative hypothesis that institutional shareholders vary in their
preferences for firms with high or low leverage. We analyze the response of institutional investors to
a break in the linkage between a firm’s capital structure and investment in the firm’s equity using
a difference-in-differences strategy. This strategy allows for an analysis of the effect of restrictions
on institutional investment that may arise from leverage clienteles. After the natural break, which
occurs when CDS contracts first trade on a firm, institutional investors may hedge the risk-return
trade-off attributable to capital structure from investing in the firm.
The introduction of CDS contracts removes the leverage constraints on an institution’s invest-
ment approach by allowing them to pursue a “capital-structure agnostic” investment approach.
The main idea is CDS contract introduction provides a semi-exogenous break in the relationship
between leverage and institutional investors, because CDS contracts allow investors to syntheti-
cally create whatever leverage they desire for a company. For example, if a potential institutional
investor is deterred by the risk-reward trade-off a highly leveraged firm offers, the introduction of
CDS removes this deterrent and makes investment in the firm’s equity more attractive. The CDS
introduction is unique from a put option because it exclusively decouples the leverage risk. While
institutional investors have long had the ability to hedge risk by trading options on a firm’s equity,
we are concerned only with the risk associated with leverage. Only a CDS contract can explicitly
compensate the contract-owner during a default or credit event.
By buying or selling this over-the-counter contract, which offers a guarantee against the non-
payment of a bond, institutional investors may hedge credit events. Only institutional investors,
hedge funds, and investment banks trade in the CDS markets, because the lower bound on the size
limit of such a contract is $5 million, which effectively eliminates most other types of investors.
Importantly, a buyer or seller of a swap does not need to own the underlying credit vehicle such
as the bond. In fact, according to the Bank for International Settlements, the notional amount of
CDS outstanding is 12 times that of the outstanding debt and there is significant ownership by
institutions such as pension funds, hedge funds, and insurance companies.
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The semi-natural experiment arising from CDS introduction should produce a clean estimate
of the relationship between institutional holdings and leverage for several reasons. First, firms
cannot elect to have CDS contracts, so the introduction of CDS contracts is independent of their
capital structure decision. Second, because CDS introduction was staggered throughout the 2000s,
economy-wide or industry-specific time trends as well as other policy changes are unlikely to con-
found estimates. Third, while CDS introduction is not completely random, by using a conservatively
estimated set of control firms, we can account for potential concerns such as CDS contracts being
introduced on firms closer to default, CDS only being introduced on firm’s with high leverage,
or liquidity increases after introduction encouraging institutional investors to change their equity
positions (Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005)). For these and similar reasons, when constructing
the set of control firms, we control for illiquidity, probability of default, firm-specific beta, leverage,
and a wide variety of firm factors.
Because our events occur at different points in time for different firms in our sample, we analyze
only a small window around each event. In particular, we limit our analysis to the three years
before and after treatment. We do not allow for overlap in treated and control firms; this implies
a firm treated in 2006 cannot be a control for a firm that is treated in 2003. Across the universe
of firms, multiple firm-specific treatment events occur in a given year, so we organize our data into
cohorts. This cohort approach allows us to use a generalized difference-in-differences estimator for
multiple events. Our exact specification is as follows:
Yict = βTreated× Postict + ΓXict + fic + δtc + ict (A.1)
where Yict is institutional holdings for firm i that is part of treatment cohort c in year t, Treated×
Postict is an indicator equal to one for treatment having occurred in cohort c by year t and equals
zero otherwise, Xict is a vector of controls, fic is a firm-cohort fixed effect, and δtc is a time-cohort
fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-cohort level. The coefficient of interest is
β, which measures the change in Yict following a natural break in the restrictions on institutional
investment that may arise from leverage clienteles relative to their control firms. Please note that
in the above specification, individual Post and Treat dummies are purposefully excluded, because
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they are collinear with the firm-cohort and time-cohort fixed effects.
The data used for the natural experiment comes from Markit, a provider of CDS quote data
since 2001. Figure C1 illustrates the two main variables we extract from the data: CDS introduction
and CDS depth. The left-hand plot shows the frequency by year that firms first had CDS contracts
actively quoted on their outstanding debt. From 2002-2012, the number of CDS introductions
ranged from approximately 10 to 110 per year. The right-hand plot shows an equivalent diagram
for CDS depth, which we define as the number of contributors providing daily CDS price quotes.
Because there is no central clearing institution for these contracts, exact CDS trade data is not
available. However, Markit collects quotes from major banks that provide pricing data from their
record books and trading system feeds. Markit’s data has previously been used in academic research
(see, e.g., Feldhutter, Hotchkiss, and Karakas (2014)), and our definition for CDS depth closely
matches such definitions. From 2002-2012, the plot reveals the typical number of contributors is 4.
As further tests of the underlying identification assumptions, we estimate two triple-differences
models. Our exact specification is as follows:
Yict = β1Treated×Post×Highict+β2Post×Highict+β3Treated×Postict+ΓXict+fic+δtc+ ict
(A.2)
where Yict is institutional holdings for firm i that is part of treatment cohort c in year t, Treated×
Post×Highict is an indicator equal to one for treatment having occurred in cohort c by year t for
the firms with high exposure and zero otherwise. High exposure means a treated firm is in the top
half of the treatment distribution in the year prior to treatment for a pre-determined covariate of
interest; in this case, the first covariate of interest is CDS depth and the second covariate of interest
is leverage. Treated× Postict is an indicator equal to one for treatment having occurred in cohort
c by year t and equals zero otherwise, Post × Highict is an indicator equal to one for the firm’s
with high exposure in cohort c by year t and equals zero otherwise, Xict is a vector of controls, fic
is a firm-cohort fixed effect, and δtc is a time-cohort fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm-cohort level. The coefficient of interest is β1, which measures the change in Yict following a
natural break in the restrictions on institutional investment that may arise from leverage clienteles
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for high exposure firms relative to their control firms.
Panel A of Table CI presents our estimates of the change in institutional holdings following
a break in the restrictions on investment that may arise from leverage clienteles. Column (1)
reveals that institutional holdings increases by 4.5 percentage points, on average, for treated firms
relative to control firms. The increase in institutional holdings after the introduction of CDS
suggests that institutional sorting contributes to the negative interrelation between leverage and
institutional ownership and that leverage clienteles exist. Column (2) shows that our results do
not rely on the firm-level controls selected. In a difference-and-differences design adding controls
may be inappropriate if the controls are also likely to be affected by treatment. The advantage of
adding controls that are unaffected by treatment is that they improve precision of the estimate.
When treatment is truly random, adding controls should not affect the actual estimate, rather they
should only help to lower the standard errors. This is precisely what Column (2) reveals – rather
than being significant at the 1% level, the estimate is significant at the 5% level in the regression
without firm-level controls.
Although one can never directly test the underlying identification assumptions for a difference-
in-differences strategy, we do perform several additional falsification tests to support our design’s
validity. First, we compare pre-treatment observables. Panel B shows that across several covariates
our set of control and treatment firms are statistically indistinguishable prior to treatment. The
covariates include: firm size, tangibility, intangibility, collateral, profitability, losses, dividend pay-
ing firm, payout, lifecycle stage, market-to-book, investment, sales growth, asset growth, firm risk,
market risk, adjusted firm returns, Amihud’s illiquidity measure, Altman’s Z-score, and insider
ownership. Second, we check that the observed change in institutional holdings coincides with the
timing of the event. Column (3) of Panel A shows that the observed effect on institutional own-
ership is statistically indistinguishable from 0 in the years prior to treatment. Third, we check for
treatment reversal. Column (4) of Panel A shows that the observed effect on institutional owner-
ship does not depend solely on the year following treatment; instead, the effect remains statistically
significant and strong in the second and third year after treatment. Such evidence is consistent
with empirical evidence that shows the introduction of CDS contracts helped to alleviate frictions
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on the supply side of the market well after initial credit concerns (Saretto and Tookes (2013)).
The two triple-differences models split on cases where theory tells us treatment effects should
be larger for one subset of observations. Specifically, treatment effects should be larger for equities
with high CDS depth. As such, we divide treated firms into high and low CDS depth based on the
median. Column (5) of Panel A shows the estimate of β1 is much stronger for equities with high
CDS depth; institutional ownership increases by 9.8 percentage points, on average, for these firms.
Our second triple-differences model splits firms into high and low leverage based on the median.
If a potential institutional investor is deterred by leverage that is too high, the introduction of
CDS removes this deterrent and makes the firm more attractive. For more levered firms, such an
introduction is theoretically more beneficial. Column (6) shows the estimate of β1 is again stronger
for equities with high leverage.
Figure C2 is the visual equivalent to Table CI; it illustrates our main results and provides a fal-
sification test of the “parallel trends” assumption. The left-hand side plot shows the treated firms
in red and control firms in blue. Both sets of firms follow parallel paths prior to the introduction
of CDS contracts but diverge post-introduction. The observed “parallel trends” prior to treatment
suggest difference-in-differences estimates are unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect for
treated firms, because absent the treatment the change in institutional ownership likely would have
been the same for the two sets of firms. The right-hand side plot illustrates an increase in insti-
tutional ownership following a shock to the linkage between leverage and institutional investment
due to the introduction of CDS. In addition, 95% confidence intervals are plotted. From the plot,
it is evident that prior to treatment, the institutional holdings of the two sets of firms were indis-
tinguishable, but following treatment, institutional holdings increased by an amount statistically
greater than 0 for the treated firms.
While the evidence suggests the semi-natural experiment, which allows us to test the response of
institutional investors to a break in the linkage between a firm’s capital structure and investment
in the firm’s equity is internally valid, external validity may still be an issue. The firms that
we used in the experimental design have greater market capitalizations and institutional holdings
than the average firm in the universe of public firms. Further, the time period under study is
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concentrated in the 2000s, and the credit risks during this time period may have been perceived
to be higher by investors. Despite the unique setting, we believe the underlying theory for why we
observe what we observe – leverage clienteles – is likely to generalize to other settings and apply
elsewhere. Our evidence to suggest generality stems from the fact that the main results hold when
we focus specifically on the holdings of the top institutional investors. For both large and small
firms, institutions are now, more often than not, the majority investor group. This implies that
even these smallest firms have at least a few institutional investors, so our results would remain
unchanged for those firms. Finally, while we motivate the introduction of CDS contracts as a way
of breaking the direct clientele link because it allows institutional investors to synthetically create
the capital structure they desire, CDS contracts also create an indirect break because they may
alter institutional investors’ monitoring incentives. For example, CDS contracts alter bondholders’
incentives to monitor and reveal information about their credits, and sophisticated institutional
investors may take advantage of this altered environment following the introduction of CDS by
investing more.
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Figure C1. Introduction of CDS: The left-hand side plot shows the frequency by year that firms
first had CDS contracts trade on their outstanding debt. The right-hand side plot shows the CDS
depth, which we define as the typical number of contributors providing daily CDS price quotes
for the firms that first had CDS contracts trade on their outstanding debt. The data come from
Markit and cover the period from 2002 through 2012.
62
     
 
60
65
70
75
80
Pe
rc
en
t O
w
ne
d 
by
 In
st
itu
tio
ns
-2 -1 0 1 2
Years Relative to Treatment
Treated
Control
Parallel Trends Pre-Treatment
-5
0
5
10
15
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 In
st
itu
tio
na
l O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Years Relative to Treatment
Average Treatment Effect for Treated Firms
Figure C2. Evidence for Leverage Clienteles: The left-hand side plot shows the treated firms
(i.e., those with CDS contracts) as a red, solid line and the control firms as a blue, dashed line.
Both sets of firms follow parallel paths prior to the introduction of CDS contracts but diverge post-
introduction. The observed “parallel trends” prior to treatment suggest difference-in-differences
estimates are unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect for treated firms, because absent
the treatment the change in institutional ownership likely would have been the same for the two
sets of firms. The right-hand side plot illustrates an increase in institutional ownership following
a shock to the linkage between leverage and investment by institutions due to the introduction of
CDS. In addition, 95% confidence intervals are plotted.
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Table CI Leverage Clientele Tests
Panel A presents estimates of the effect of a semi-natural break in leverage clienteles on institutional holdings.
The estimates stem from a difference-in-differences specification outlined in Eq. (A.1), where Post×Treatict
is an indicator equal to one for treatment having occurred in cohort c by year t and equals zero otherwise.
Columns (5) and (6) present estimates from a triple-difference specification outlined in Eq. (A.2), where
Post× Treat×Highict is an indicator equal to one for treatment having occurred in cohort c by year t for
the firm’s with high exposure and zero otherwise. High exposure means a treated firm is in the top half of the
treatment distribution in the year prior to treatment for a pre-determined covariate of interest; in this case,
the first covariate of interest is CDS depth and the second covariate of interest is leverage. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the firm-cohort level, are reported in parentheses. Panel B of this table presents the
summary statistics, prior to treatment for a set of firm characteristics. Firms for which CDS contracts were
introduced are the treated group, and the control group includes firms matched based on propensity-score
design estimated from a logit regression with one-year lags of all of the covariates listed in Panel B. ***, **,
and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A. Dep. Var. = Institutional Holdings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated x Post 0.045*** 0.043**
(0.017) (0.017)
Treated x Year = t-1 0.006
(0.009)
Treated x Year > t 0.036***
(0.013)
Treated x Post x High CDS Depth 0.093**
(0.039)
Treated x Post x High Leverage 0.036
(0.024)
Firm-level Controls Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Cohort Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Cohort Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R 2 66.1% 66.1% 65.9% 66.0% 66.1% 66.0%
Observations 3670 3670 3670 3670 3670 3670
Panel B. Falsification Test, Pre-Treatment Statistics Mean SD Mean SD
Institutional Holdings 67.8% 24.9% 67.9% 24.9% (0.06)
Leverage 32.8% 22.5% 33.6% 20.9% (0.43)
Profitability 0.140 0.105 0.136 0.098 (0.39)
Market-to-book 1.573 1.207 1.581 1.268 (0.08)
Dividend Paying Firm 0.491 0.501 0.457 0.499 (0.83)
Capital Expenditures 0.058 0.045 0.058 0.052 (0.02)
Tangibility 35.4% 25.1% 34.5% 23.2% (0.45)
Payout 0.034 0.056 0.032 0.053 (0.23)
Collateral 0.445 0.253 0.437 0.229 (0.39)
Intangibility 20.7% 19.8% 21.4% 18.6% (0.40)
Losses 0.041 0.199 0.034 0.182 (0.43)
Insider Holdings 3.6% 14.2% 2.7% 5.9% (0.90)
Beta 1.098 0.588 1.112 0.535 (0.32)
Altman's Z-Score 1.321 2.266 1.363 1.783 (0.25)
Amihud Liquidity 0.086 0.440 0.087 0.539 (0.02)
Controls Treated Difference T-
statistic
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